








RECKONING WITH ADJUDICATION’S 
EXCEPTIONALISM NORM 
EMILY S. BREMER† 
ABSTRACT
Unlike rulemaking and judicial review, administrative adjudication 
is governed by a norm of exceptionalism. Agencies rarely adjudicate 
according to the Administrative Procedure Act’s formal adjudication 
provisions, and the statute has little role in defining informal 
adjudication or specifying its minimum procedural requirements. Due 
process has almost nothing to say about the matter. The result is that 
there are few uniform, cross-cutting procedural requirements in 
adjudication, and most hearings are conducted using procedures 
tailored for individual agencies or programs. This Article explores the 
benefits and costs of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm, an analysis 
that implicates the familiar tension between uniformity and 
specialization in the law. It argues that the exceptionalism norm 
overemphasizes specialization, at great cost. This Article urges a new 
regime designed to more properly balance the values of specialization 
and uniformity. The proposal contemplates that as in rulemaking, the 
project would entail an interbranch effort to protect fundamental rights 
and promote institutional integrity while preserving space for needed 
agency discretion. 
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law is commonly understood as a quasi-
constitutional body of law, supported by the APA as its superstatute 
backbone, which applies uniformly across the administrative state.1 
This standard narrative, which has coalesced over the past decade or 
so, has three distinct but related threads. First, administrative law is 
“quasi-constitutional” because it provides rules that perform 
constitutional functions in a realm little governed by the U.S. 
Constitution.2 These functions include constituting government 
institutions, determining institutional boundaries, regulating the 
relationship between agencies and citizens, and protecting 
fundamental values. The second thread of the standard narrative 
provides that the core of administrative law’s quasi-constitution is a 
superstatute3: the APA.4 Enacted after an intense political and 
normative debate, the APA codified a fierce compromise regarding the 
1. See Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70 ADMIN.
L. REV. 807, 811–24 (2018); Emily S. Bremer, The Exceptionalism Norm in Administrative 
Adjudication, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1351, 1357–71 [hereinafter Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm].
2. Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 65 FLA.L.REV. 1215, 1218, 
1221–22 (2014) [hereinafter Bremer, Unwritten Administrative Constitution]. 
3. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John 
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001). 
4. See generally Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 
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structure, operation, and place of administrative agencies within the 
federal government.5 That compromise has proven to be so durable for 
so long that it is, at least as a practical matter, entrenched.6 These 
characteristics give the APA its superstatute status and lend it 
significant normative weight.7 The third thread in the narrative is a 
concept that arises from the first two: because administrative law is a 
quasi-constitutional field supported by a superstatute, scholars and 
courts have rejected “administrative law exceptionalism”—that is, 
claims that individual agencies or regulatory fields are so unique that 
they should be exempted from general principles of administrative law 
and procedure.8 For example, the Supreme Court has refused to apply 
a more deferential standard of review to the Internal Revenue 
Service’s (“IRS”) interpretation of the tax code9 and has held that the 
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) is subject to traditional 
standards of judicial review.10 
Although this standard narrative is offered to explain the status 
and operation of administrative law generally, it does not fit 
5. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). 
6. See Bremer, Unwritten Administrative Constitution, supra note 2, at 1236–44; Kovacs, 
supra note 4, at 1208.
 7. See Kovacs, supra note 4, at 1223–37. 
8. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the 
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270–72 (2007); Kristin E. 
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with 
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1730– 
31 (2007); Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and IRS Regulations, 
136 TAX NOTES 271, 271 (2012); Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent 
Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149, 149–50 (2016) [hereinafter Walker, Patent 
Exceptionalism]; Eleanor D. Wood, Note, Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism: Bringing Temporary 
Treasury Regulations Back in Line with the APA, 100 MINN. L. REV. 839, 840–42 (2015). But see 
Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE
21, 23 (2014); James M. Puckett, Structural Tax Exceptionalism, 49 GA. L. REV. 1067, 1074–75
(2015); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1898– 
1901, 1918–20 (2014).
 9. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–56 (2011);
Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L.
REV. 221, 222 (2014); see also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow 
Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518–19 (1994) (criticizing tax myopia as a 
“misperception”). The Duke Law Journal dedicated a previous symposium to the topic of 
administrative law exceptionalism in tax. See generally Amandeep S. Grewal, Foreword: Taking 
Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE L.J. 1625 (2014).
 10. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999); Walker, Patent Exceptionalism, supra 
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adjudication, one of the two primary forms of agency policymaking.11 
This significant deficiency was long overlooked because the standard 
narrative has been built using examples drawn from rulemaking and 
judicial review, important areas in which the narrative has undeniable 
explanatory power. In those contexts, the narrative’s three strands— 
administrative law’s quasi-constitutional status, the APA as a 
superstatute, and the rejection of administrative exceptionalism— 
operate together to produce a unified descriptive and normative 
account of how administrative law operates. Adjudication, however, 
defies the standard narrative. 
In a previous article, I argued that adjudication is ruled by a norm 
of exceptionalism: a presumption in favor of procedural specialization 
and against uniform, cross-cutting procedural requirements.12 In the 
immediate wake of the APA’s adoption, the Supreme Court briefly but 
vigorously defended the statutory regime in Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath,13 a case involving deportation hearings.14 Congress overrode 
the Court’s program-specific holding by statute.15 The Supreme Court 
capitulated,16 and over the ensuing decades courts adopted a 
thoroughly deferential posture toward procedural due process in 
adjudication, in both its constitutional and statutory variants.17 Just as 
the episode set the judicial tone, so too was it a harbinger of the 
legislature’s attitude toward administrative adjudication. Over the 
decades, Congress routinely has ignored or deviated from the APA, 
creating unique adjudication procedures to suit the needs of individual 
agencies or regulatory programs. Aided by the unified and permissive 
congressional–judicial attitude, agencies have consistently avoided the 
APA’s adjudication provisions. The consequence has been a severe 
cabining of the APA’s adjudication provisions, outside of which have 
flourished hundreds of distinct procedural regimes that share virtually 
no common source of law.18 
 11. See Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1353–54. 
 12. See id. at 1409–11. 
13.  Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
 14. Id. at 52–53. 
15. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306 (1955); William Funk, The Rise and Purported 
Demise of Wong Yang Sung, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 885 (2006) [hereinafter Funk, The Rise and 
Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung].
 16. See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306–07.
17. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
 18. Cf. Matthew Lee Wiener, Chairman’s Foreword to MICHAEL ASIMOW, FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, at v 
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Adjudication’s exceptionalism norm turns administrative law’s 
standard narrative on its head. In this important context, nearly every 
agency and program is viewed as so unique that it warrants exception 
from the APA.19 The APA itself probably contributes to the problem. 
Under the APA, “adjudication” is a catch-all category encompassing 
any “agency process for the formulation of an order,”20 which in turn is 
defined as “the whole or a part of a final disposition . . . in a matter 
other than rule making but including licensing.”21 But the problem goes 
deeper. It is blackletter law that “formal” adjudications are conducted 
under the APA’s adjudication provisions, while “informal” 
adjudications are subject only to the minimal requirements of the 
APA’s “ancillary matters” provision22 and constitutional due process.23 
As Professor Michael Asimow has persuasively shown, however, the 
traditional division of adjudication into “formal” and “informal” 
varieties is inaccurate and misleading in view of actual agency 
practice.24 A careful analysis of the caselaw further reveals that the 
concepts essential to this blackletter doctrine—“formal,” “informal,” 
and even “adjudication”—lack any stable or coherent meaning.25 The 
APA’s adjudication provisions are more ignored than entrenched, and 
the exceptionalism norm by definition, albeit paradoxically, reveals the 
APA’s failure to “prove robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over 
govern [informal adjudications] often say little, if anything, about the basic procedures [the 
agency] must observe, and thereby leave procedural choices in agency hands.”). The regulations 
and guidance that establish the procedural structure of many adjudication programs may be 
understood as the internal administrative law of adjudication. See generally Gillian E. Metzger &
Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017).
 19. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication 
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1005–08 
(2004) [hereinafter Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella]; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is 
the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70–72 (1996); Elizabeth Ayres 
Whiteside, Comment, Administrative Adjudications: An Overview of the Existing Models and 
Their Failure To Achieve Uniformity and a Proposal for a Uniform Adjudicatory Framework, 46 
OHIO ST. L.J. 355, 357 (1985).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2018). 
 21. Id. § 551(6). 
 22. Id. § 555. 
 23. See Emily S. Bremer, Designing the Decider, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 69 & n.10, 
71 (2018) [hereinafter Bremer, Designing the Decider]; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334–35 (1976). 
 24. MICHAEL ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 3 (2016) [hereinafter ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS], https://www.acus. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/adjudication-outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-final-
report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EDA-DQGG].
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time.”26 The inescapable conclusion is that in adjudication, the APA is 
no superstatute. Turning to the final strand of the standard narrative, 
the vast and varied rules that govern agency adjudication surely serve 
some of the functions associated with constitutions, but the rules are 
nonuniform, easily changeable, and incoherent in core respects. 
Adjudication may be governed by an unwritten constitution. But not 
one that is sound.27 
This Article argues that adjudication’s exceptionalism norm 
should be rejected because it insufficiently protects individual interests 
and undermines the institutional integrity of the administrative state. 
By definition, the norm rejects uniformity, even with respect to the 
most fundamental of procedures. The result is that programs often lack 
basic procedural protections, with potentially severe consequences for 
affected individuals. But it is hard to know how frequently procedural 
protections are relaxed or omitted because the exceptionalism norm 
promotes widespread diversity that defeats transparency and impedes 
both legal and political oversight. Even when subpar procedures can 
be identified, the exceptionalism norm rejects the kind of cross-cutting 
minimum requirements that would enable reform. Although 
procedural flexibility could facilitate system-wide procedural 
improvement over time, the norm’s near-total rejection of uniformity 
provides no foundation for successes—or failures—in procedural 
experimentation to be disseminated across agencies and programs. 
Exceptionalism also undermines efficiency: each agency must mind its 
own procedures, deprived of the information and expertise that would 
be generated and made available by centralized review of uniform 
requirements. Finally, the norm undermines the institutional integrity 
of the administrative state by allowing procedural regimes that ignore 
the special needs of quasi-judicial action in an administrative context. 
Overall, this Article argues, the costs of exceptionalism outweigh its 
benefits. 
At the heart of this analysis is a familiar tension between 
uniformity and specialization. This tension arises in other procedural 
fields, most notably civil procedure and federal courts, as well as in the 
debate over the uniform law movement. This Article draws on the 
experience and literature in these areas to enrich its discussion, arguing 
that uniformity and specialization are not mutually exclusive goals but 
 26. Kovacs, supra note 4, at 1209 (quoting Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 1216); see 
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 3, at 111. 
 27. See Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1356.
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competing values that must be properly balanced. Adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm rejects any such balance. Instead, the norm’s 
purpose and effect are to limit uniformity to the greatest extent 
possible, in favor of maximizing space for specialization.28 This Article 
rejects both adjudication’s exceptionalism norm and its zero-sum 
approach to procedural design. It argues not for complete uniformity— 
which is neither desirable nor achievable—but rather for an approach 
calibrated to balance uniformity and specialization in adjudication 
procedures. Such an approach prevails with respect to the other 
primary form of agency policymaking: rulemaking. As in rulemaking, 
adjudication would benefit from the development and enforcement of 
a core set of minimum procedural requirements that apply uniformly 
across all agencies. This Article considers the possibilities for achieving 
this goal, arguing that the project requires the involvement of all 
branches of the federal government. It concludes by addressing various 
objections to the proposal. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the effects of 
adjudication’s exceptionalism norm through a series of six examples of 
adjudication programs. This cross section, though small, offers a sense 
of the variety among adjudication programs, along dimensions such as 
size, structure, and regulatory purpose. It also allows some 
examination of how exceptionalism affects the system-wide 
observance of the most basic procedural protections of individual 
interests and institutional integrity. Part II uses this foundation to 
argue that the exceptionalism norm harms both individual and 
institutional interests. Although it offers benefits for individual 
programs, the norm’s extremity puts some of the most valuable system-
wide benefits of procedural flexibility out of reach. In the end, Part II 
argues that the exceptionalism norm should be rejected. Part III 
considers how best to forge a new and more defensible norm in 
administrative adjudication. It recognizes that this effort may serve two 
distinct goals: enforcing minimum procedural requirements and 
pursuing uniformity. It argues that the best and most feasible solution 
may be found where these possibilities overlap, in a regime similar to 
that which governs rulemaking. At the broadest level, this would bring 
administrative law’s standard narrative to bear on adjudication. Part 
28. Constitutional due process defines the limits here, see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35, but 
they are modest and flexible, resulting in a narrowing judicial role in procedural innovation across 
a variety of contexts, see Jason Parkin, Dialogic Due Process, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1118 
(2019). 
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IV identifies and briefly responds to objections, with the goal of 
provoking further discussion. 
I. ADJUDICATION’S EXCEPTIONALISM NORM
This Part begins by briefly explaining adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm and how that norm contradicts the standard 
narrative of administrative law that fares so well with respect to 
rulemaking and judicial review. It then explores the consequences of 
the norm by offering six examples of agency adjudication. 
A. A Hole in Administrative Law’s Standard Narrative 
As explained above, adjudication does not fit the standard 
narrative of administrative law. To understand the implications of this 
proposition, it may be worthwhile to consider what it means to say that 
rulemaking—the other primary form of agency policymaking—does fit 
the standard narrative.29 Rulemaking is the process through which 
agencies develop rules or regulations that have general, prospective, 
legal effect.30 The APA provides for two kinds of rulemaking: formal 
and informal.31 Today, the formal rulemaking process is all but dead, 
and the vast majority of regulations are adopted through informal 
rulemaking.32 This process is commonly referred to as “notice-and-
comment” rulemaking,33 a term that roughly describes the minimum 
procedures required by § 553 of the APA.34 The courts have fleshed 
out these minimum procedures through a robust body of 
administrative common law.35 The executive, agencies, courts, 
Congress, and scholars have accepted the notice-and-comment process 
 29. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383 (2004) (exploring the methods by which agencies make policy, including rulemaking, 
and those methods’ processes, effects, and susceptibility to judicial review). 
 30. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)–(5) (2018). 
 31. Compare id. § 553 (providing procedures for informal notice-and-comment rulemaking), 
with id. §§ 556–557 (providing procedures for formal rulemaking). 
 32. E.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 128 n.5 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Today . . . formal rulemaking is the Yeti of administrative law. There are isolated sightings of it 
in the ratemaking context, but elsewhere it proves elusive.”); Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of 
Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 238 (2014).
 33. See, e.g., Perez, 575 U.S. at 96.
 34. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 35. See, e.g., TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF 
RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 13–17 (2017); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing 
Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2012). 
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as the default definition of “rulemaking.”36 Thus, when Congress 
authorizes an agency to adopt regulations, it typically allows § 553 to 
supply the default procedural rules, only rarely creating unique 
procedural schemes.37 When Congress, the executive, or agencies 
impose or observe additional procedures in rulemaking, they generally 
do so by embellishing the APA’s notice-and-comment process.38 For 
their part, courts and scholars define rulemaking according to § 553’s 
procedures and have mostly rejected the claims of individual agencies 
for special exception from those procedural requirements.39 This 
rejection of “administrative exceptionalism” in rulemaking ensures 
that all agencies are uniformly subject to the general administrative law 
principles established by § 553 and fleshed out by the courts. The 
 36. See Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73 MD. L. REV. 1060, 1090–91 
(2014); cf. Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5, 16 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Because 
notice and comment is the default, ‘the onus is on the [agency] to establish that notice and 
comment’ should not be given.” (alteration in original) (quoting Action on Smoking & Health v. 
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 713 F.2d 795, 801 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983))).
37. For example, “[v]irtually all of the Dodd-Frank rules to which deadlines apply are 
legislative rules, for which notice-and-comment is the default procedural requirement.” Jacob E. 
Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L.
REV. 689, 731 (2013). When Congress imposes agency- or program-specific rulemaking 
requirements, it typically adds to—but does not displace—the requirements of § 553. See Henry 
H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations 
by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1696 (1986) [hereinafter 
Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies]. Such “hybrid rulemaking” procedures, 
the paradigmatic examples of which are found in the Magnuson-Moss Act (governing the Federal 
Trade Commission) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, are not the norm and are 
generally disfavored. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 112 (1998); Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before 
Federal Agencies, supra, at 1696; see also ACUS Recommendation 79-1: Hybrid Rulemaking 
Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,817 (July 3, 1979); ACUS 
Recommendation 80-1: Trade Regulation Rulemaking Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 46,772 (July 11, 1980).
 38. See Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies, supra note 37, at 1696; see 
also ACUS Recommendation 80-1, 45 Fed. Reg. at 46,773 (recommending that, to avoid 
confusion, Congress not require procedures in addition to § 553, but that agencies should have 
discretion to use extra procedures). 
 39. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 8, at 270–72 (rejecting patent law exceptionalism); 
Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1683–87 
(2007) (describing potential hurdles to a judicially created immigration law exceptionalism); 
Hoffer & Walker, supra note 9, at 222 (describing the death of tax exceptionalism); Wood, supra 
note 8, at 840–42 (setting up the problem of Treasury noncompliance with the APA). Scholarly 
rejection of administrative exceptionalism has not been unanimous. See, e.g., John M. Golden, 
Working Without Chevron: The PTO As Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1659 (2016) (arguing 
for how the PTO can influence substantive patent law without the deference that ordinary 
administrative law principles would provide); Puckett, supra note 8, at 1074–75 (arguing that 
structural tax exceptionalism has important benefits and should not casually be set aside); 
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resulting regime is not one of pure uniformity. Agencies have 
discretion to tailor the process to their unique needs provided that they 
comply with the APA’s minimum requirements.40 Thus, agencies may 
impose additional procedures on themselves in rulemaking.41 And 
agencies have fairly broad latitude to experiment with procedural 
innovations during the stages of the process that are not addressed by 
the APA.42 
An inverse reality prevails in adjudication, which is governed by a 
norm of exceptionalism. As in rulemaking, most administrative 
adjudication is “informal.” But the similarities end there. The APA has 
no adjudicatory analogue to § 553 that provides default procedures for 
informal adjudication.43 Lacking a statutory substrate, the courts have 
not developed such procedures through administrative common law. 
Due process provides a theoretical floor, but in practice, its 
requirements are so flexible that it imposes minimal limitations on 
agency procedural discretion. The result is that there are few, if any, 
general principles of administrative adjudication. Most adjudications 
are conducted according to procedures that have been tailored to suit 
the substantive needs of the individual agency or regulatory program.
In a prior article, I used a detailed examination of one 
administrative adjudication scheme—the Patent and Trial Appeal 
Board’s (“PTAB”) inter partes review process—to show concretely 
how adjudication defies administrative law’s standard narrative.44 This 
approach illuminated a number of important points that would have 
escaped a shorter and necessarily more superficial treatment. First, it 
demonstrated how, in the absence of a uniform set of default 
procedural rules, it is difficult and laborious to construct an individual 
 40. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978). 
 41. Id.
 42. See Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 893, 897 
(2011); cf. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking in Practice, 5 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 482, 486 (1986) (arguing that the need for public comment on a rule can be satisfied by 
“[u]sing negotiations to prepare a proposed rule, and then allowing notice-and-comment 
rulemaking”).
 43. See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text. As noted, the APA has a provision 
addressing “ancillary matters,” and these matters may arise in adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. § 555 
(2018). But that provision does not attempt to provide a default procedural regime for informal 
adjudication, as § 553 does for informal rulemaking.
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procedural process from the ground up.45 Second, the in-depth 
examination of inter partes review revealed the way that adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm changes the conduct of every federal government 
institution when adjudication rather than rulemaking is at issue. 
Congress sought to fashion an “adjudicative” process by creating a 
detailed statutory structure designed to import federal district court 
processes into an administrative context.46 Congress did not use—and 
apparently did not even consider using—the APA’s adjudication 
provisions as the relevant procedural baseline. Following Congress’s 
lead, when the PTO fleshed out the inter partes review procedures 
through regulations and guidance, it also used federal district court 
practice—and not the APA—as the touchstone of its procedural 
design. On judicial review of the agency’s action, the Federal Circuit 
has characterized inter partes review as formal APA adjudication,47 but 
it is not clear what effect that characterization has had on the agency’s 
process. 
Perhaps the most striking takeaway from the case study of PTAB 
adjudication is that the APA has little stable role in defining “formal” 
or “informal” adjudication or specifying the essential procedural 
elements of adjudication. Indeed, the courts have offered four different 
approaches to defining “formal” adjudication, the application of which 
lead to at least three possible answers to the question of whether inter 
45. The exercise requires a close examination of applicable statutes, regulations, and other 
agency documents and practices, as well as careful consideration of how these various materials 
interact with and affect one another. Fully describing the inter partes review process required ten 
pages, only a fraction of the hundreds of pages of statutes, regulations, and agency guidance that 
establish the inter partes review procedures. See id. at 21–30. Even this omits other sources of 
information about the inter partes review process that any good lawyer representing a client 
before the PTAB would consult, such as judicial decisions, previous PTAB decisions, and 
valuable but unwritten information gleaned through experience practicing before the agency. Cf.
Samuel P. Jordan, Local Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 WM.&MARY L.
REV. 415, 461 (2010) [hereinafter Jordan, Local Rules] (discussing the need for lawyers to learn 
local rules as an argument for cementing local legal practice through rulemaking). 
 46. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 46–47 (2011). 
 47. See Anacor Pharm., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Novartis AG v. 
Torrent Pharm. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Rovalma, S.A. v. Bohler-Edelstahl 
GmbH & Co. KG, 856 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re NuVasive, Inc., 841 F.3d 966, 971 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); 
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled on other 
grounds by Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc); Belden Inc. v. 
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partes review is formal adjudication.48 The seemingly inescapable 
conclusion is that, at least in the context of adjudication, the APA does 
not operate as a superstatute. For scholars, practitioners, and 
policymakers familiar with other areas of administrative law, this result 
may be surprising and disheartening. 
B. A Cross Section of Adjudication Programs 
To complement the perspective of my previous article’s in-depth 
examination of a single adjudication program, this Article uses a series 
of examples of how agencies use and conduct adjudication to give a 
broader view of the effects of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm. The 
resulting cross section reveals the great diversity of federal 
adjudication programs and the procedures that are observed within 
them. This sets the stage for Part II’s normative evaluation of 
exceptionalism’s virtues and vices. 
The examples draw from an unprecedented database of 
information about administrative adjudication that was made available 
through a project undertaken by the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (“ACUS”) to catalog the procedures used in 
adjudicatory programs throughout the federal government.49 The 
project discards the formal–informal dichotomy for classifying agency 
adjudications, instead dividing adjudication programs into three 
categories: Type A, Type B, and Type C.50 Type A adjudications are 
those subject by statute or regulation to the APA’s procedures for 
“formal” adjudication, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557.51 Type B 
adjudications are proceedings in which a statute, regulation, or 
executive order requires an evidentiary hearing that is not subject to 
48. Courts have applied de novo, compelled, voluntary, and deference approaches. Bremer, 
Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1399–1400. The three answers include all the possibilities: 
that inter partes review is formal, maybe formal, and informal. Id. 
49. ACUS is a free-standing federal agency that studies administrative procedure and makes 
recommendations for improvements “to administrative agencies, . . . the President, Congress, 
[and] the Judicial Conference of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. § 594(1) (2018); see also ACUS, 
ADMIN. CONF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/acus [https://perma.cc/JPS7-F5SV]. I was employed as 
an Attorney Advisor at ACUS when the project was started in 2013, and I was promoted to serve 
as the agency’s Research Chief while the project was still ongoing. I was not, however, staffed to 
the project and did not participate in the study design or data collection. 
 50. ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 2. 
 51. Id. Type A thus includes proceedings that would not be considered “formal” under the 
traditional approach because they are not required by statute to be conducted under the APA’s 
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the APA’s adjudication provisions.52 In a Type B adjudication, the 
presiding officer is a non-ALJ adjudicator.53 This person may be 
referred to as an “administrative judge,” (“AJ”), although many other 
titles are used for substantially the same kind of official.54 This 
decisionmaker must observe the “exclusive record principle,” meaning 
that she “is confined to considering inputs from the parties (as well as 
matters officially noticed) when determining factual issues.”55 Type B 
proceedings are traditionally categorized as “informal” adjudications, 
although this is misleading because many, if not most, of them are 
conducted using trial-like procedures that are, in a colloquial sense, as 
or more formal than the APA’s procedures.56 Finally, Type C 
adjudications are those in which an evidentiary hearing is not legally 
required and the agency may decide without a hearing.57 The ACUS 
project includes only Type A and Type B proceedings.58 It produced a 
database of adjudication programs and procedures that is publicly 
available online and jointly supported by ACUS and Stanford Law 
School.59 
Adjudication is used in many different kinds of agencies to 
administer a broad range of programs that vary along multiple 
dimensions, including hearing structure, regulatory purpose, and 
program size. Structurally, some hearings are adversarial, while others 
are inquisitorial. An “adversarial” hearing is one that is “characterized 
by dispute or a clash of interests,”60 in which two opposing parties 
present their dispute to a neutral judge for independent resolution. In 
contrast, an “inquisitorial” hearing is one in which “the judge conducts 
the trial, determines what questions to ask, and defines the scope and 
 52. ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 2. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Bremer, Designing the Decider, supra note 23, at 76. 
 55. ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 4. 
 56. Id. at 3. At the same time, and as the examples below will show, some Type B programs 
do not have all of the definitional characteristics suggested here, e.g., the exclusive record 
principle. See infra Part I.C. 
 57. ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 2. 
 58. Id. The project began with ACUS staff conducting a thorough search and review of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) to identify adjudication programs and the procedures used 
to administer them. FAQ, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., 
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/content/user-guide [https://perma.cc/2F5N-S5JG]. The data so 
collected were sent to agencies for verification. Some agencies verified the information, but others 
did not. 
 59. Federal Administrative Adjudication, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., 
http://acus.law.stanford.edu [https://perma.cc/6UNP-QCUN]. 
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the extent of the inquiry.”61 Although adversarial hearings are a 
hallmark feature of the American legal system, courts have held that 
an inquisitorial hearing in the administrative context can satisfy the 
Constitution’s Due Process Clause.62 Regardless of hearing structure, 
adjudication is used for a wide variety of regulatory purposes, including 
to administer government-benefit programs, to make individual 
deportation determinations, to adjudicate federal employees’ 
discrimination claims, to evaluate the validity of patents, to resolve 
disputes between individual agencies and government contractors, and 
to resolve many different kinds of disputes between private parties. 
The size of agency adjudication programs, as measured by 
caseload statistics, also varies widely. The caseload statistics of a 
handful of individual agencies match or dwarf those of the federal 
courts. For example, in 2013, 826,635 cases were filed with the Social 
Security Administration (“SSA”),63 while a comparatively paltry 
271,950 actions were filed in all of the U.S. district courts put together.64 
Table 1 provides caseload statistics for the ten largest adjudication 
programs in FY 2013.65 Although some administrative programs 
adjudicate very few cases per year, there can be no doubt that most 
adjudication in the United States is conducted by administrative 
agencies, not federal courts. 
 61. Inquisitorial System, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 62. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408–410 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
266 (1970); Hepp v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 798, 805–06 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 63. SSAOBENE0001 – Hearing Level – Procedures, ACUS-STAN.U.ADJUDICATION RES., 
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/ssaobene0001-hearing-level-procedures [https://perma.cc/ 
G4YK-7SKV] [hereinafterACUS SSA Hearing Procedures]. 
 64. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES 
COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 
31, 2012 AND 2013, at 1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_ 
dir/C00Mar13.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EW7-YXYZ]. 
65. This data was compiled from the ACUS database. 
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TABLE 1: TOP TEN LARGEST ADJUDICATION SCHEMES (FY 2013)








Hearing Level Procedures 
(SSAOBENE0001) 
826,635 793,580 847,984 
Department of 
Health & Human 
Services 
Medicare Hearing Level 
Procedures (HHSOOBEN0001) 
384,151 79,377 240,116 
Department of 
Justice 
Immigration Hearing Level 
Procedures (DOJXEOIR0001) 
271,279 253,942 * 
Social Security 
Administration 
Appeal Level Procedures 
(SSAOBENE0001) 
172,492 176,251 157,311 
Department of the 
Treasury 
IRS Hearing Level Procedures 
(TRSYIRSA0008) 
44,684 48,192 21,099 
Department of 
Veterans Affairs 
Board of Veterans’ Appeals 
Hearing Level Procedures 
(DOVABENE0001) 




Office of Field Programs Hearing 
Level Procedures 
(EEOCFEDS0002) 
7,077 6,789 8,313 
Federal Mine Safety Hearing Level Procedures 
Health Review (FMSHFADJ0001) 
Commission
6,898 12,262 7,612 
Department of 
Health & Human 
Services 
Departmental Appeals Board 
Medicare Appeals Council 
(HHSOOBEN0001) 
4,277 2,591 4,637 
Department of 
Labor 
Office of Administrative Law 
Judges Hearing Level Procedures 
(LABROALJ0002) 
4,269 3,534 5,004 
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In the interest of space and time, only a handful of the 432 
adjudication schemes included in the ACUS–Stanford Database can 
be included in this Article’s analysis.66 I have selected six adjudication 
schemes in an effort to offer a cross section of the diverse 
characteristics evident in adjudication programs government-wide. In 
the remainder of this Section, I briefly explain these choices and also 
summarize the key characteristics of each agency and its mission, as 
well as the adjudication scheme I have selected to evaluate. Part I.C 
offers a snapshot of the procedural variation that is observable across 
the six exemplar programs. 
1. Social Security Administration. The SSA is “an independent 
agency in the executive branch” responsible for administering federal 
social insurance and benefit programs.67 Although the SSA operates 
five adjudication schemes,68 I will focus here on the single scheme the 
agency uses to administer federal retirement and disability programs.69 
This scheme has both a hearing and appellate level.70 At the hearing 
level, the proceedings are classified as Type A because they involve an 
oral hearing conducted before an ALJ under the APA’s adjudication 
provisions.71 The SSA nonetheless describes the hearings as “informal 
and non-adversarial,” at least in part because they are inquisitorial in 
structure.72 Although these SSA hearings are perhaps the most widely 
recognized example of “formal” APA adjudication—and the vast 
 66. The ACUS–Stanford Database catalogs adjudication “schemes,” which are defined as 
“one or more case types that are adjudicated by one office and that have similar sets of 
procedures[,] [e]ven if the case types are authorized under different statutes or regulations.” FAQ, 
supra note 58. On the other hand, “if two case types are handled by the same office, but their 
procedures are very different, then they are classified as different schemes.” Id. In this Article, I 
often refer to adjudication “programs,” but use “schemes” when I am reporting information 
contained in the database. The terms are related but not interchangeable.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 901 (2018). 
68. Social Security Administration, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES.,
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/agency/social-security-administration [https://perma.cc/3WK4-44RG].
 69. SSAOBENE0001, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES.,
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/scheme/ssaobene0001 [https://perma.cc/6SYW-YQEF] [hereinafter 
ACUS SSA Benefits]. There are five case types within this scheme. Id. The information in the 
ACUS-Stanford database for this scheme has been verified by SSA. ACUS SSA Hearing 
Procedures, supra note 63. 
 70. ACUS SSA Benefits, supra note 69.
 71. ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 1, 18. 
72. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110–11 (2000); see ACUS SSA Hearing Procedures, supra
note 63. The SSA has verified the information contained in the ACUS-Stanford database. ACUS
SSA Hearing Procedures, supra note 63. 
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majority of all ALJs are employed by the SSA73—there is some dispute 
about whether the Social Security Act requires the agency to conduct 
hearings under the APA.74 Regardless, the hearings are profoundly 
important to millions of Americans. They are the process through 
which these individuals are granted—or denied—much-needed 
financial benefits. 
Although the SSA’s programs are conducted under the APA’s 
adjudication provisions, they should be included in this study for 
several, interrelated reasons. First, they are perhaps the largest and 
most well-known adjudication programs in the federal government, 
serving the unique and important regulatory purpose of administering 
the federal social safety net. They are therefore an important 
component of the diverse landscape of agency adjudication. Second, 
because the SSA conducts these hearings under the APA’s 
adjudication provisions, they offer a useful control group in evaluating 
the sufficiency of the procedures that are observed in adjudication 
programs. Third, the longstanding lack of clarity about whether the 
SSA is required to comply with the APA’s adjudication provisions 
opens up the possibility that under the current, highly deferential 
standards, the SSA may have the discretion not to comply with the 
APA’s procedures. Given the scope and importance of the programs, 
it is worth considering whether less protective procedures would be 
acceptable. If not here, why elsewhere? Finally, and for all of the 
reasons listed above, any proposed reform of the APA’s definition of 
or procedures for adjudication must consider the potential 
consequences for the SSA’s programs. 
2. Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The PTAB is an adjudicatory 
body within the PTO, which is a subagency of the Department of 
 73. E.g., Evan D. Bernick, Is Judicial Deference to Agency Fact-Finding Unlawful?, 16 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 63 (2018) (“The agency that employs the most ALJs is the [SSA], which 
employs more than 1,500 . . . .”). 
 74. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION: EVALUATING THE STATUS AND PLACEMENT OF ADJUDICATORS IN THE 
FEDERAL SECTOR HEARING PROGRAM 11 n.73 (2014) [hereinafter EEOC REPORT]; cf. 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 409 (1971) (“We need not decide whether the APA has 
general application to social security disability claims, for the social security administrative 
procedure does not vary from that prescribed by the APA.”). See generally Robin J. Arzt, 
Adjudications by Administrative Law Judges Pursuant to the Social Security Act Are Adjudications 
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Commerce.75 The PTAB’s work is conducted through a single 
adjudication scheme.76 The scheme includes multiple case types, 
including most notably inter partes review77 and post grant review78 of 
patents.79 These hearings are conducted according to procedures 
developed jointly by Congress—through the America Invents Act of 
2011 (“AIA”)—and the PTO—through rules and guidance 
implementing the AIA.80 These procedures were designed to reduce 
costs, improve efficiency, and better serve patent law’s substantive 
goals.81 The hearings are adversarial in structure, and the resulting 
decisions determine the validity and scope of patents.82 The decisions 
can have significant consequences for patent holders as well as 
individuals and businesses who might otherwise find themselves being 
sued in federal court for patent infringement.
These proceedings are best classified as Type B adjudications, 
although there is some dispute about whether they are “formal” 
proceedings subject to the APA.83 As has already been suggested, the 
proceedings are not conducted under the APA’s adjudication 
 75. See 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2018) (establishing the PTO as an agency within the Department 
of Commerce); id. § 6(a) (establishing the PTAB). The Department of Commerce operates 
twenty adjudication schemes through its various sub-agencies and offices. Department of 
Commerce, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., http://acus.law.stanford.edu/agency/ 
department-commerce [https://perma.cc/R37D-N3ER].  
 76. USDCPATE0021, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., http://acus.law.stanford.edu/ 
scheme/usdcpate0021-0 [https://perma.cc/7574-D6AV]. 
 77. USDCPATE0021 – Case Type 1, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., 
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/case-type/usdcpate0021-case-type-1 [https://perma.cc/4ZM7-ZY83]. 
78. USDCPATE0021 – Case Type 2, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., 
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/case-type/usdcpate0021-case-type-2 [https://perma.cc/G85U-NHQ3].
79. The remaining case types include derivations, USDCPATE0021 – Case Type 3, ACUS-
STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., http://acus.law.stanford.edu/case-type/usdcpate0021-case-type-3 
[https://perma.cc/D4A2-88PV], the transitional program for covered business methods patents,
USDCPATE0021 – Case Type 4, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., 
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/case-type/usdcpate0021-case-type-4 [https://perma.cc/T27H-5JTP], 
and ex parte and ex parte reexamination appeals, USDCPATE0021 – Case Type 5, ACUS-STAN.
U. ADJUDICATION RES., http://acus.law.stanford.edu/case-type/usdcpate0021-case-type-5 
[https://perma.cc/DE7A-AX3G]. 
 80. Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1354.
 81. Id. at 1373–74. 
82. The Supreme Court recently rejected a constitutional challenge to the inter partes review 
process under Article III and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. Oil States Energy 
Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371–72 (2018). 
 83. See  ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, supra note 18, at 164; 
Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 
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provisions.84 In drafting the AIA, Congress apparently did not consider 
the APA as a possible source of default procedural rules. Instead, it 
created a wholly new and quite detailed procedural regime to suit the 
particular needs of patent law, using federal district court proceedings 
as a touchstone for the design. In its implementing regulations and 
guidance, the PTO did likewise. The presiding officials in PTAB 
hearings are Administrative Patent Judges (“APJs”), not ALJs.85 As I 
argued in a previous article, administrative law does not clearly answer 
the question of whether these proceedings are best classified as 
“formal” or “informal” hearings.86 The courts have articulated four 
approaches to applying this traditional dichotomy. As applied to inter 
partes review proceedings before the PTAB, those approaches yield 
three different answers to the question of whether the hearings are 
formal adjudications.87 This indeterminacy is borne out in the available 
case law. The Federal Circuit has classified the hearings as “formal” 
adjudications for limited procedural purposes—for example, notice 
requirements88—but has suggested that the hearings are not formal for 
deference purposes.89 
The PTAB’s adjudication scheme is worth including in this study 
because it is a paradigmatic example of a highly tailored and trial-like 
adjudication scheme. It offers important insight into how even a 
carefully crafted and detailed adjudication scheme may omit 
fundamental procedural elements.
3. Executive Office of Immigration Review. The Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) is an executive agency that administers a number of 
adjudication programs, the most prominent of which is used to enforce 
 84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
85. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2018). 
 86. Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1400.
87. These possible answers cover the water and include “yes,” “no,” and “maybe.” Id. at 49.
 88. See supra note 47; see also ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, 
supra note 18, at 17 n.65 (discussing these cases). 
89. Although the court has not ruled definitely on the question, some of its judges have 
suggested that PTAB decisions are not sufficiently “formal” to warrant Chevron deference. See 
Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring); 
id. at 1335 (Reyna, J., concurring in part). Other judges on the Federal Circuit, however, would 
apply Chevron to the PTAB’s decisions. Id. at 1343 (Taranto, J., dissenting); id. at 1358 (Hughes, 
J., dissenting). Whether Auer deference should apply to the PTAB interpretations of its 
regulations likely warrants reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
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immigration law by making deportation decisions.90 This scheme is 
administered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(“EOIR”). The hearings are Type B adjudications not conducted 
under the APA’s adjudication provisions.91 The officials who preside 
over the hearings are non-ALJ Immigration Judges (“IJs”).92 The IJs’ 
orders have profound consequences for the named individuals and are 
crucially important as a matter of national policy.93 Problems with the 
procedures in these centrally important agency adjudications were a 
significant motivating factor in the APA’s adoption.94 Over the 
decades, the scheme has continued to experience significant 
procedural and political problems.95 For all of these reasons, it merits 
inclusion in this cross section of agency adjudication. 
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is an independent 
90. As one scholar has recently argued, deportation proceedings, although prominent, are 
just one part of immigration enforcement. See generally Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of 
Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1463 (2019). 
91. Shortly after the APA was adopted, the Supreme Court held that deportation 
proceedings had to be conducted under the APA’s adjudication provisions. Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 53 (1950). But Congress legislatively overruled that decision, and the 
Supreme Court acquiesced. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306–07 (1955). This early episode 
contributed greatly to the development of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm. See Bremer, 
Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1404.
 92. See Kent Barnett & Russell Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status, 
Selection, Oversight, and Removal, 53 GA. L.REV. 1, 13 (2018); Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s 
Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 21 (2018); Walker & Wasserman, supra note 83, at 153. 
 93. See, e.g., Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: A Study of 
Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785, 840 (2018) (“These judicial 
reversals of [the Department of Homeland Security]’s ‘no bond’ decisions reveal that immigration 
judges play an important role in tempering agency decisions that would otherwise subject families 
to overdetention.”); Kim, supra note 92, at 3–4, 20–22 (evaluating the important role of 
immigration courts and IJs for individuals facing deportation as well as for the development of 
national policy). 
 94. See Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 37.
 95. See Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 2006); Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 
683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006); LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, REPORT FOR THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: ENHANCING QUALITY AND 
TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 24–25, 27–29 (2012); Jill E. Family, A 
Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 611, 624, 627, 
632 (2009); Kim, supra note 92, at 5–6; Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): 
Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 
504 (2013); John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many 
People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 29–32, 76 (2005); 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
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agency responsible for the administration and enforcement of various 
federal employment discrimination laws.96 Structured as a 
multimember, bipartisan commission, the agency is composed of five 
commissioners appointed by the president with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.97 Through its Federal Sector Program, the EEOC 
conducts voluntary, adversarial hearings of federal employees’ 
discrimination claims against federal agency employers.98 The 
presiding officials in these cases are non-ALJ adjudicators referred to 
as “Administrative Judges.”99 The AJs issue decisions that resolve 
federal employee discrimination claims and may order the federal 
agency employers to take appropriate action. The employing agencies 
must either comply with the AJ’s decision or appeal to the EEOC. The 
complaining employee may also appeal to the EEOC and, if unsatisfied 
with the results of the administrative process, may file a federal 
employment discrimination action in federal district court.100 
There are a number of good reasons to include the Federal Sector 
Program, a program unique in several respects, in this cross section of 
agency adjudication.101 First, the regulatory purpose of the program is 
important and unique. In addition to offering one avenue for 
implementing federal nondiscrimination laws, the program is an 
example of a scheme in which an agency adjudicates one party’s claim 
against another, adverse party.102 Second, although commonly cited as 
the foundation for the program, the EEOC’s organic statutes do not 
 96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2018); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (2019). 
 97. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a). 
98. See EEOCFEDS0002 – Hearing Level – Procedures, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION 
RES., http://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/eeocfeds0002-hearing-level-procedures 
[https://perma.cc/8RH5-6XD3]. 
 99. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f); Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 4015, 4017 n.1 (Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614); EEOC REPORT, supra
note 74, at 39. 
100. The timeframe for the complainant to file suit in court depends on the timing of the final 
agency action and may also depend on whether the complainant has filed an appeal with the 
Commission. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407; Bullock v. Berrien, 688 F.3d 613, 617–18 (9th Cir. 2012). 
The EEOC has recently proposed to modify its regulations to clarify that an appeal to the EEOC 
is optional and not a mandatory condition on the complainant’s ability to file a federal action. See 
Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 84 Fed. Reg. at 4016. 
101. One reason to include the program in this study is its size—the Federal Sector Hearing 
Program is among the top ten largest adjudication schemes in the federal government. See supra
Table 1. 
102. In one sense, the government is on both sides of this adversarial relationship, as the 
claimant is a federal employee with a claim against his or her federal agency employer. But the 
adjudicating agency, i.e., the EEOC, is not a party to the action, so the program is also similar to 
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contain the word “hearing” or any other language suggesting that the 
EEOC must or should carry out its statutory responsibilities through 
adjudication.103 This makes the program especially unique.104 Third, 
despite the lack of statutory direction or requirement, the agency has 
designed substantially trial-like procedures governing the hearings.105 
These procedures include, among other things, rules governing 
discovery and the production of documents106 and permitting the use 
of class actions.107 The program is thus an excellent example of one in 
which an agency has used its broad discretion not to avoid procedural 
requirements but to create and subject itself to them.108 Fourth, if a 
claimant dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative process 
goes to court, the suit is an original federal action, not a review of the 
agency’s action. The AJ’s decision may be entered as part of the 
evidence, but it is entitled to no deference, and the judicial trial of the 
claim is conducted de novo. Federal Sector hearings thus fall squarely 
within the APA adjudication provisions’ exemption for agency 
hearings that involve “a matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law 
and the facts de novo in a court.”109 
5. Department of Agriculture. The United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) is an executive department created “to acquire 
and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful 
information on subjects connected with agriculture, rural 
development, aquaculture, and human nutrition, in the most general 
and comprehensive sense of those terms, and to procure, propagate, 
 103. See, e.g., EEOCREPORT, supra note 74, at 23; SAMUEL ESTREICHER &DAVID L.NOLL,
LEGISLATION AND THE REGULATORY STATE 479 (2d ed. 2017). The EEOC apparently did not 
make the initial decision to include hearings in the procedures used to carry out these statutory 
responsibilities, which it inherited from the Civil Service Commission under a 1978 
reorganization. See Major John P. Stimson, Unscrambling Federal Merit Protection, 150 MIL. L.
REV. 165, 165–66 (1995); Major Michele E. Williams, Getting the Fox Out of the Chicken Coop: 
The Movement Towards Final EEOC, ARMY LAW., Jul. 1999, at 13, 18.
104. Agencies ordinarily adjudicate when a statute authorizes or requires an adjudication 
program. 
 105. See EEOCREPORT, supra note 74, at 9. 
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(d), (f)(1). 
 107. Id. § 1614.204. 
108. The EEOC recently considered whether to convert its AJs to ALJs. See EEOCREPORT, 
supra note 74, at 1; U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 
PLAN FY 2013–2016, at 17, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm [https://perma.cc/D44Y-
N5T8]. It ultimately decided against taking that course of action.
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and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.”110 
USDA operates twenty-five adjudication schemes through twenty-one 
different offices, divisions, and agencies.111 A number of USDA’s 
adjudication schemes are Type A hearings conducted under the APA’s 
adjudication provisions.112 Many of these programs are grounded in 
statutes that clearly require APA adjudication by instructing the 
agency to conduct a “hearing on the record.”113 In other programs, 
however, the agency has elected to use Type A procedures in the 
absence of such a clear statutory requirement.114 
USDA also administers several Type B adjudication schemes, 
including one under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act 
(“PACA”) that will be included in this cross section of agency 
adjudication.115 This scheme, which is administered by the USDA’s 
PACA Division, adjudicates commercial disputes between private 
parties regarding agricultural commodities.116 The decisionmakers in 
these proceedings are called “examiner[s]” and are attorneys 
employed in the Office of the USDA General Counsel.117 In this 
scheme, private parties bring claims for reparations against other 
private parties. The result of the process is a report and tentative order 
that may require the charged party to pay a potentially large sum to the 
110. 7 U.S.C. § 2201 (2018). This statute, first enacted in 1862, artfully begins by saying: 
“There shall be at the seat of government a Department of Agriculture, the general design and 
duties of which shall be.” Id.; see An Act To Establish a Department of Agriculture, ch. 72, 12 
Stat. 387 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.). 
 111. Department of Agriculture, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., 
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/agency/department-agriculture [https://perma.cc/5TBC-3KUK]. 
 112. See ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 36. 
113. In one high-profile program, the statute does not contain the magic words “hearing on 
the record,” but in a series of cases involving the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), several 
circuits held that the statute nonetheless requires APA adjudication. See Five Points Rd. Joint 
Venture v. Johanns, 542 F.3d 1121, 1125–29 (7th Cir. 2008); Aageson Grain & Cattle v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., 500 F.3d 1038, 1043–46 (9th Cir. 2007); Lane v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 120 F.3d 106, 108– 
10 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1385–88 (discussing 
these cases while exploring how EAJA affects judicial interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)). USDA 
eventually acquiesced. See 7 C.F.R. § 11.4(A) (2019); ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
ADJUDICATION, supra note 18, at 16. 
 114. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2149(a) (providing for license suspension or revocation under the 
Animal Welfare Act). 
 115. See USDAPACA0004 – Hearing Level – Procedures, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION 
RES., http://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/usdapaca0004-hearing-level-procedures [https:// 
perma.cc/H6HC-5E7M]. The database information for this program was not verified by the 
agency and does not include caseload statistics. Id. 
 116. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 47. 
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claimant. These are transmitted to the Secretary of Agriculture, along 
with the record of the proceeding, for review and issuance of a final 
order.118 The scheme merits inclusion here because it offers a different 
mixture of characteristics, including a smaller caseload and an 
adversarial structure involving disputes between purely private parties. 
6. Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Department of Veterans 
Affairs (“VA”) is an executive department charged with responsibility 
for “administer[ing] the laws providing benefits and other services to 
veterans and the[ir] dependents and . . . beneficiaries.”119 The Board of 
Veterans’ Appeals (“BVA”) is a component of the VA that reviews 
benefit claims determinations made in the first instance by local VA 
offices.120 The presiding officers are AJs bearing the title of “Veterans 
Law Judge.”121 The benefits that may be granted or denied through this 
process include disability, healthcare, and cemetery benefits.122 If a 
veteran is dissatisfied with the Board’s decision, he or she may appeal 
to an Article I court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.123 
This scheme, which has a long history, is inquisitorial in structure and 
uniquely paternalistic.124 It is included in the study because it is large, 
central to important matters of the federal government’s operation, 
and affects the rights of persons who may be both vulnerable and owed 
special solicitude.125 
C. Exceptionalism’s Effect on Procedures
What effect does adjudication’s exceptionalism norm have on the 
procedures that are observed across this small but diverse pool of 
agency adjudication schemes? Rather than providing a detailed 
discussion of each program’s procedures, I offer here a snapshot 
focusing on the presence or absence of ten important procedural 
elements. All of these elements have been identified as best practices 
 118. Id. §§ 47.21, .23. 
119. 38 U.S.C. § 301(a)–(b) (2018). 
 120. Id. § 301(c)(5). 
 121. DOVABENE0001 – Hearing Level – Procedures, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION 
RES., http://acus.law.stanford.edu/hearing-level/dovabene0001-hearing-level-procedures [https:// 
perma.cc/Q5AL-JEKS]. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251, 7261. 
 124. ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, supra note 18, at 178–79. 
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for Type B adjudication.126 Nine of the ten have been widely and 
historically recognized as fundamental to the conduct of a fair 
adjudication, as evidenced by their inclusion in constitutional 
protections or in the APA’s adjudication provisions. One—the 
availability of a written-only or paper hearing option—has been 
identified as important because it protects individual interests and 
efficiency goals.127 The ten elements128 include: 
(1)  written notice of the proceedings;129 
(2)  the availability of a written-only or paper hearing option;130 
(3)  the opportunity to rebut contrary evidence; 
(4)  observance of the exclusive record principle, according to 
which the decision must be based exclusively on matters 
entered into the record of the hearing;131 
(5)  restrictions on ex parte communications with the 
decisionmaker;132 
(6)  provisions designed to protect against a biased 
decisionmaker;133 
(7)  the use of an AJ or other dedicated adjudicator to preside 
over the hearing;
(8)  the requirement of a written decision;134 
126. ACUS Recommendation 2016-4: Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016).
 127. See Michael Asimow, Best Practices for Evidentiary Hearings Outside the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 958 (2019) [hereinafter Asimow, Best Practices]. 
The APA itself recognizes that paper hearings are sometimes appropriate, even in formal 
hearings. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). 
 128. See ACUS Recommendation 2016-4: Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314, 94,316 (Dec. 23, 2016). I have omitted other 
best practices that do not implicate sufficiently important individual interests, would impose 
unwarranted burdens on agencies if centrally controlled and standardized, or obviously would be 
inappropriate in many hearings. These matters include, for example and respectively, electronic 
filing, discovery rules, and open hearings. See id. at 94,315–16. 
 129. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2018); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
313–14 (1950). 
 130. See ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, supra note 18, at 19–20. 
 131. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(e); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
 132. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d). 
 133. See id. § 556(b); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (“And, of course, an impartial decision maker 
is essential.”). 
 134. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(A). 
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(9)  a right to reconsideration of the initial decision through an 
appeal within the agency; and 
(10)a complete statement of the core procedural components of 
the process set out in published regulations.135 
In this analysis, I recognize that a scheme includes an element only 
if that element is legally required by statute or regulation or written 
down in the agency’s applicable guidance documents. As a 
consequence, if an adjudication scheme includes an element as a matter 
of practice or informal norm, I do not recognize it. This is for two 
reasons. First, evidence that the element has been observed as a norm 
or informal practice says nothing of the frequency or consistency with 
which the element is observed. Second, that the procedural element 
has not been written down in regulations or guidance suggests that it is 
discretionary and perhaps that the agency has neglected or 
undervalued it. 
Table 2 summarizes the procedural elements of the selected 
examples. The goal in providing this cross section is a modest one: to 
provide a sense of the diversity of adjudication programs and 
procedures and to offer some context and foundation for assessing the 
effects of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm. It is perhaps already 
striking, however, how many of the programs lack even these most 
basic elements. As Table 2 shows, the BVA falls furthest short in the 
analysis, including only 50 percent of the listed procedures. The 
programs that fare best are SSA adjudication, because it is conducted 
under the APA; EEOC Federal Sector hearings, which perhaps 
ironically would be exempt from the APA; and the USDA’s PACA 
hearings. It bears noting, too, that the procedural elements listed here 
are defined at a broad level of generality.136 Some have argued that 
despite the great variety in adjudication programs and the details of 
their attendant procedures, most agencies have gravitated towards 
similar procedural norms.137 There is some truth to this, but the cross-
agency similarity emerges only at a very high level of generality.138 Such 
 135. See id. § 552(a)(1)(C).
136. This in part reflects the broad definitions in the ACUS recommendation. See Bremer, 
Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1404–05. 
 137. See Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, supra note 15, at 891– 
92. 
 138. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 537 (2006) 
[hereinafter Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century]. 
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modest uniformity is like a mirage, dissipating as soon as one ventures 
close enough to inspect it. 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF PROCEDURAL ELEMENTS139 
USDA
SSA PTAB EOIR EEOC BVA
PACA
1 Written Notice Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Written-Only Option Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 




Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
5 Ex Parte Protections Yes Some Some No No No
6 Bias Protection Yes No Some Yes Yes No
7 Use of AJs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 Written Decision Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
9 Reconsideration Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
10 Procedural Regulations Yes Yes No No Yes No
TOTAL (Out of 10) 10 7–8 6–8 8 8
II. EVALUATING EXCEPTIONALISM
This Part normatively evaluates adjudication’s exceptionalism 
norm. At the core of this analysis is a familiar tension—between 
uniformity and specialization—that is not unique to administrative 
adjudication. Courts and scholars have grappled with this tension 
elsewhere, including in civil procedure140 and in the debates over 
 139. See ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 35. 
 140. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 319 (2008) [hereinafter Bone, Making Effective Rules]; Stephen B. Burbank,
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specialized courts141 and the uniform law movement.142 This Part draws 
on that experience, adapting it to the different institutional needs of 
L. REV. 693, 693 (1988); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,”
2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 535 [hereinafter Burbank, The Dilemmas of “General Rules”]; Paul D. 
Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the 
Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2068 (1989); 
Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural 
Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2008); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: 
Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 731 (1975); Jordan, Local Rules, 
supra note 45, at 415; Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing 
a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 1167, 1186 (2005); Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and 
Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 315 (2011); Thomas O. Main, 
Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in 
Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 
319 (2001); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 374 (2010); David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the 
Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1191; Note, The Bar Favors Uniform State 
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 TEMP. L.Q. 145, 145 (1943) [hereinafter The Bar Favors 
Uniform State and Federal Rules]. 
 141. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts 
To Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 224 (1991); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts 
in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330 (1991); Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize 
the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 
1269 (2005); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 
64 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1, 1 (1989); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized 
Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995); John M. Greacen, Let Us 
Dispense with the Myth That America Needs or Wants Generalists, 41 JUDGES J. 45, 45 (2002); 
Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 746 (1981); Alan B. 
Parker, Examining Distinctive Jurisprudence in the Federal Circuit: Consequences of a Specialized 
Court, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 269, 287 (2009); Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The 
Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (1991); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: 
Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 877 (2002); Diane P. Wood, Judge 
of All Trades: Further Thoughts on Specialized Courts, 99 JUDICATURE 11, 16 (2015); see also 
Emily S. Bremer & Jonathan R. Siegel, Clearing the Path to Justice: The Need To Reform 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1500, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2013); Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of 
Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 115 (1997).
 142. See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement 
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 424–25 (2004); Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the 
Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 
569, 572 (1998); Fred H. Miller, The Uniform Commercial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 
43 MERCER L.REV. 799, 799 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 62 LA. L.REV. 1097, 1104–05 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, 
An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (1996); John J. 
Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and Model Acts, 42 FAM.L.Q. 673, 674 (2008); Lawrence Schlam, 
Federalism and the Question of Uniform Laws: The Case of Third Party Custody “Standing” 
Provisions, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 158 (2012). I focus on these issues as they arise 
in domestic law, but similar issues also arise in international law. See Michael G. Bridge, 
Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of International Sale, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 55, 55 (2003); 
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administrative adjudication.143 So adapted, it emerges that the principal 
costs of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm are that it insufficiently 
protects individual interests and undermines the institutional integrity 
of the administrative state. Against these costs are arrayed undeniable 
benefits of specialization that inure at both the programmatic and 
system-wide levels.144 These benefits must be acknowledged, and 
uniformity should be pursued not reflexively but rather intentionally 
and with sensitivity to context.145 This Part argues that the 
exceptionalism norm should be rejected because it suffers from an 
inverse problem: the reflexive pursuit of specialization without 
appropriate sensitivity to context or cost. 
A. Harm to Individual Interests 
A defining characteristic of an adjudication is that it produces 
orders that are not generally applicable but rather affect the rights or 
interests of a particular person or entity.146 For the named individual, 
the order that emerges from an agency hearing can be very significant: 
the person may be deported, deprived of needed financial benefits, 
subject to a significant fine or tax, or denied an essential business 
license. And a positive outcome of a hearing may be similarly 
important or life changing. These individually significant effects have 
systemic importance. Adjudication is a common point of contact 
between individual citizens and government.147 And taken together, 
adjudicatory orders fulfill—or subvert—some of Congress’s most 
profound statutory mandates. It is crucial that the process be just, 
transparent, and efficient. Failures in individual cases are likely to have 
profound system-wide consequences.148 
143. For example, concerns about forum shopping and vertical disuniformity, which are 
central to discussions of uniformity in the Erie context, are not implicated in administrative 
adjudication. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938); cf. Amanda Frost, 
Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1603 (2008) (“Despite Erie’s broad rhetoric, the 
rationales underlying the Court’s hostility to nonuniformity between state and federal general 
common law, and the forum shopping that resulted, do not apply to conflicts over the meaning of 
federal law.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 142, at 137–41 (summarizing the costs and 
benefits of uniform laws). 
 145. See Frost, supra note 143, at 1579.
 146. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); Londoner 
v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908). 
147. Other very common points of contact would include paying taxes, voting, and use of the 
Postal Service. 
148. As this discussion suggests, there is a connection between individual interests and 
institutional integrity, although this Part seeks to analyze each separately. 
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For these reasons, administrative law should be deeply concerned 
with protecting the rights and interests of the individuals affected by 
agency adjudications. Do agencies, once largely released from the 
strictures of uniform, judicially enforceable minimum procedures, 
discard important procedural protections for the private interests 
affected by adjudication? One need not take a dim or cynical view of 
administrative agencies to answer this question in the affirmative. 
Indeed, recent scholarship casts doubt on the common and all-too-easy 
supposition that agencies reflexively seek to expand the realm of 
discretion and correspondingly reduce the reach of legal restrictions 
that might otherwise constrain their action. In some cases, agencies in 
fact prefer to be legally bound.149 There are many examples of how 
agencies can and do use their discretion to cultivate desirable norms in 
administration, including with respect to procedural design.150 
Nonetheless, even if individual agencies seek in good faith to tailor 
adjudication procedures appropriately to suit unique programmatic 
needs, they may still end up omitting important and necessary 
procedural elements. 
Procedural data from the six example programs identified in Part 
I suggest that the exceptionalism norm facilitates the omission of 
important procedural protections in adjudication. It is a broadly 
accepted principle that ex parte communications should not be 
permitted in an adversarial proceeding in which individual rights are 
adjudicated. An ex parte communication is one that occurs between a 
judge or adjudicator and one party to an adversarial proceeding 
 149. See ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 17; Elizabeth Magill, Agency 
Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 860 (2009); J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch, Agencies 
Running from Agency Discretion, 58 WM. &MARY L. REV. 97, 108 (2016) (documenting agency 
aversion to discretion); Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 
1924–26 (2016); cf. Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1209, 1211 
(2018) [hereinafter Nielson, Optimal Ossification] (arguing that some ossification of the 
rulemaking process is beneficial precisely because it makes administrative change more difficult 
and less likely and thereby makes agency commitments more credible).
 150. See Emily S. Bremer & Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee’s 
White Space, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 523, 524 (2017). Examples of agencies using their 
discretion in good faith to improve administration and administrative procedure are ubiquitous. 
See, e.g., Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 133 (2013) (documenting agency efforts to address issues raised by the 
incorporation by reference of extrinsic materials in regulations); Dooling, supra note 42, at 897– 
99 (arguing that the APA does not need to be updated to accommodate e-rulemaking, in part due 
to a positive outlook on agencies’ use of discretion). But see generally U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE 
ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS (2012) (documenting agency efforts to 
avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements). 
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outside the presence or knowledge of the other party to the 
proceeding.151 This norm is broadly and uncontroversially observed in 
judicial proceedings.152 The APA’s adjudication provisions and the 
Administrative Conference’s best practices for Type B proceedings 
both prohibit ex parte contacts in adjudication.153 And yet, as Tables 2 
and 3 show, of the six examples included here, only the program 
conducted under the APA—SSA benefits adjudication—clearly 
prohibits ex parte communications. 
TABLE 3: EX PARTE PROTECTIONS INCLUDED?
USDA
SSA PTAB EOIR EEOC BVA
PACA
Yes Some Some No No No 
Both the PTAB and EOIR have ex parte protections for some but 
not all cases, while the EEOC, USDA PACA, and BVA do not have 
ex parte rules. A broader look at the ACUS–Stanford Database 
suggests that this is representative of adjudication programs writ large. 
The omission is widespread. Table 4 illustrates this point. 
 151. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (2018). 
152. The norm, although broadly observed, is not absolute. Federal courts recognize 
exceptions to the general prohibition on ex parte communications, such as to allow certain non-
substantive or non-prejudicial communications and to accommodate the possibility of a post-
communication disclosure and opportunity to respond. See  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT R. 2.9 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(2)(B) (providing that an order appointing 
a master “must state . . . the circumstances, if any, in which the master may communicate ex parte 
with the court or a party”). The administrative “prohibition of ex parte contacts emanates from 
the basic character of adjudication” and is thus informed by the judicial tradition. Edward Rubin, 
It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 119 
(2003). 
 153. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d); ACUS Recommendation 2016-4: Evidentiary Hearings Not 
Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314, 94,315 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
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TABLE 4: ARE EX PARTE CONTACTS PROHIBITED?154 
Yes Yes 
(All Types of (Some Types Unknown (No 
Total # Cases) of Cases) No Data Provided)
Hearing Level 364 129 (35.4%) 10 (2.7%) 159 (43.7%) 66 (~18.1%) 
Appellate 156 69 (44.2%) 1 (0.6%) 37 (23.7%) 49 (~31.4%) 
Level
TOTAL 520 198 (38.1%) 11 (2.1) 196 (37.7%) 115 (~22.1%) 
It is possible that some of the agencies in the ACUS–Stanford 
database prohibit ex parte communications in practice despite the 
apparent lack of such a prohibition in their written rules.155 It is also 
possible that closer inspection of individual schemes would reveal that 
some have good reasons for not observing an ex parte prohibition. For 
example, prohibiting ex parte communications may not be appropriate 
in inquisitorial proceedings or proceedings designed to generate 
broadly applicable norms.156 It seems unlikely, however, that a 
reasonable justification is available in nearly 40 percent—and perhaps 
as much as 60 percent—of adjudication schemes.157 
A complete analysis of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm 
demands an inquiry that is neither device limited nor agency specific. 
Rather, it should involve a multi-element, system-wide empirical 
assessment of exceptionalism’s consequences. The analysis should be 
“multi-element” in the sense that it should encompass a suite of 
indispensable procedural elements of sound adjudication, and it should 
be “system-wide” in the sense that it captures the trends across 
agencies and adjudication programs. 
 154. See Ex Parte Contacts, ACUS-STAN. U. ADJUDICATION RES., 
http://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/ex-parte-contacts [https://perma.cc/P7CJ-N57D]. Of the 520 
programs included here, 176 were verified by the agency. Id.
 155. See ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 38. 
156. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Where agency action 
resembles judicial action, . . . the insulation of the decisionmaker from ex parte contacts is justified 
by basic notions of due process to the parties involved. But where agency action involves informal 
rulemaking of a policymaking sort, the concept of ex parte contacts is of more questionable 
utility.” (footnotes omitted)). 
157. With data unavailable for ~22.1 percent of the schemes, it appears possible that nearly 
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An empirical assessment of this kind requires two things, both of 
which are imperiled by the exceptionalism norm itself. First, the 
assessment requires a metric for assessing the adequacy of adjudication 
procedures. What procedural elements are necessary and 
indispensable for a hearing to protect private interests adequately? By 
definition, adjudication’s exceptionalism norm rejects a clearly defined 
metric, and reasonable disagreements in identifying one are sure to be 
legion. One touchstone might be the APA’s procedural requirements 
for formal adjudication.158 Alternatively, one might use the best 
practices for Type B adjudication that the ACUS has recently 
adopted.159 I have used a combination of these, but the exceptionalism 
norm makes that choice easily contestable. Second, once a metric is 
identified, actual adjudication procedures must be compared against 
it.160 The ACUS–Stanford database is the best source of system-wide 
information, and it can be supplemented with examples, such as those 
provided in Part I, or deep-dive examinations, like those that Professor 
Asimow and I have offered elsewhere.161 Some uncertainty in the 
analysis is inevitable, however, because the world of adjudication is so 
vast and varied, and the information about applicable procedures is 
both diffuse and, once located, frequently incomplete or opaque. The 
breathtaking variety engendered by exceptionalism shelters the norm 
from empirical evaluation. 
Through this discussion, it begins to emerge that a principal cost 
of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm is that it seriously undermines 
transparency. This cost manifests in program-specific and system-wide 
ways. In all of its manifestations, the driving mechanism is the same. 
By facilitating the widespread development of tailored procedures, 
adjudication’s exceptionalism norm fosters abundant procedural 
diversity across hundreds of agencies and adjudication programs. This 
diversity makes it extremely difficult to identify and evaluate 
 158. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–557; Walker & Wasserman, supra note 83, at 149. 
 159. See ACUS Recommendation 2016-4: Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314, 94,315–16 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
160.  It is difficult to devise better procedural rules in the absence of good information about 
existing rules and how they work in practice. See Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 140, 
at 319; Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 841, 842 (1993); Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable 
Relationship: Civil Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REV. 103, 103–13 (1997); 
Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO.WASH.L.REV. 
455, 484–89 (1993). 
 161. See ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24; Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm, 
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adjudication procedures. As previously noted, understanding the 
procedures used in a single adjudication program is laborious, 
requiring a careful reading of the particular statutes, regulations, and 
agency guidance that govern the program. What one learns about the 
procedures of one adjudication program is rarely applicable to other 
adjudication programs.162 As a consequence, studying adjudication on 
a systemic level is extremely difficult and requires a significant 
investment of both time and resources.163 These difficulties are 
apparent even in the ACUS–Stanford database, an incredible resource 
that nonetheless has limitations attributable to the unwieldy universe 
of adjudication the exceptionalism norm has allowed to flourish. 
Among these limitations are that the database does not include Type 
C adjudications,164 the information can be difficult to interpret because 
the database necessarily seeks to standardize a broadly diverse 
universe of information,165 and much of the information it contains is 
unverified by the adjudicating agency.166 In addition, the database will 
not be updated because it is not reasonably possible for the ACUS—a 
tiny agency with limited staff and budgetary resources167—to do the 
continuous, substantial work that updating would require. Thus, 
although the database offers an unparalleled, system-wide view of 
agency adjudication, that view is necessarily a snapshot frozen in time. 
 162. Cf. O. L. McCaskill, Against Uniformity, in The Bar Favors Uniform State and Federal 
Rules, supra note 140, at 148, 148 (arguing that national uniformity in civil procedure stifles 
improvement by individual states in civil procedure).
163. Thus, for example, it took years for the ACUS to compile its extensive database of 
adjudication procedures. The agency created several forms to collect the information (a challenge 
given the diversity under study) and staff then combed through the CFR to complete the forms. 
FAQ, supra note 58. “For ‘major’ schemes, as well as some ‘minor’ schemes, [the] forms were sent 
to agency representatives for review and correction” before being entered into the database, 
which Stanford University built and hosts. Id.
 164. See ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 2. 
 165. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
166. Approximately 61.8 percent (267) of the 432 adjudication schemes included in the 
database are marked as “not verified” by the agency in question. See Schemes, ACUS-STAN. U.
ADJUDICATION RES., http://acus.law.stanford.edu/schemes?title=&title_1=&field_is_this_major 
_adjudication_value=All&field_verified_by_agency_value=0 [https://perma.cc/Q8DV-XBLC] 
(select “Not verified” label under “Verified by Agency” search filter). As the database FAQs 
explain: “If a representative from the appropriate agency reviewed the information and returned 
it to the Administrative Conference, then the information was marked as ‘Verified by Agency’ in 
the database.” See FAQ, supra note 58. 
167. As of FY2018, the ACUS had an annual appropriation of $3.1 million. ADMIN.
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Moving beyond discrete procedural protections, adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm also imperils individual interests by expanding 
the opportunities for substantive policy choices to be made under the 
guise of procedure. Although there are often sound, neutral reasons 
for Congress or an agency to tailor procedural rules, these institutions 
may also use procedural means to manipulate substantive outcomes. 
For example, when Congress enacted the AIA, it sought to achieve the 
substantive goals of patent law through its painstaking design of the 
statutory procedures governing the inter partes review process.168 At 
least one of the statute’s goals was to make it easier, less expensive, and 
more common for patents to be narrowed or invalidated, a goal that 
was pursued by tailoring judicial patent-litigation procedures to suit the 
administrative context. The agency has also more directly used 
procedural manipulation to effectuate substantive outcomes. In the 
absence of agency head control over the outcome of PTAB decisions, 
the PTO director has adopted a practice of “stacking” panels with 
judges sympathetic to the director’s preferred outcome in order to 
control the substance of decisions that are made on reconsideration.169 
The practice is not unlawful, and it is in a certain sense consistent with 
Congress’s delegation of statutory authority to the agency to achieve 
certain desired outcomes.170 Nonetheless, the practice has been 
controversial.171 To affected individuals, particularly those whose 
victory is overturned on reconsideration by a stacked panel, it must 
seem procedurally irregular and substantively unfair.172 
B. Harm to Institutional Integrity 
The use of procedural techniques to manipulate substantive 
outcomes is also the first of several harms that manifest at the 
institutional level. Substantive policy sought covertly through the guise 
of procedure may be less effective, more indirect and inefficient, 
likelier to produce unintended consequences, more difficult to 
evaluate, and harder to change when the real policy rationale has not 
and cannot be forthrightly acknowledged. More profoundly, 
procedural manipulation undermines democratic accountability in at 
 168. See Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1373.
 169. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 83, at 184. 
170. The dark side of substantively focused procedural design is discussed in Part II.B.
 171. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, When Can the Patent Office Intervene in Its Own Cases?, 73 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 225–27 (2018); Walker & Wasserman, supra note 83, at 184–85. 
172. The effects of the practice for institutional integrity are considered in Part II.B. 
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least one of two senses.173 In the first and weaker sense, it allows the 
agency to avoid responsibility for its actions by making the substantive 
choice less obvious or obscuring it altogether.174 Second, it may 
undermine democratic accountability in a stronger sense that 
implicates the separation of powers. This occurs when an agency uses 
procedural choices to covertly pursue substantive ends that were not 
part of Congress’s legislative compromise or that are in tension or 
outright conflict with the agency’s statutory mandate.175 These 
problems are not confined to adjudication: even in rulemaking, where 
agencies are constrained by general administrative law principles, 
there is evidence that agencies use procedure to evade political 
oversight and increase the chances of producing the agency’s preferred 
substantive outcome.176 But adjudication’s exceptionalism norm 
expands the scope of agency procedural discretion and, with it, the 
opportunities for these machinations. 
Even when outcome manipulation is not afoot, exceptionalism 
makes procedural design and maintenance less efficient and stunts 
procedural evolution. These serious harms are interrelated. The 
opacity of adjudication deprives courts, agencies, practitioners, 
scholars, and policymakers of access to cross-cutting procedural 
knowledge and precedent. Exceptionalism makes it more difficult for 
courts to understand adjudication, leading to inefficiencies and errors 
and incentivizing inattention.177 Administrative law scholars, as 
previously noted, rarely study adjudication procedures on a cross-
cutting basis. Agency officials and legislative policymakers are unlikely 
to have or seek access to information about how other agencies 
administer adjudication programs. The absence of ready access to 
information about adjudication procedures increases the likelihood 
that Congress, when creating a new adjudication program, will include 
unique procedural provisions in the statutory design. The 
exceptionalism norm emerged from administrative law’s failure to 
 173. See Burbank, The Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 140, at 537.
 174. Id.
175. Similar tensions arise when other, non-legislative entities have made procedural 
changes. See id.
 176. See generally  RACHEL AUGUSTINE POTTER, BENDING THE RULES: PROCEDURAL 
POLITICKING IN THE BUREAUCRACY (2019).
 177. Cf. Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81, 101 (2015) (noting that the 
D.C. Circuit gains specialized knowledge from reviewing a large volume of agency appeals, but 
that “agency personnel and procedures are constantly evolving alongside technological or other 
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develop general principles governing adjudication. Now established, it 
is a powerful force against remedying that failure. 
The absence of general administrative law principles of 
adjudication also means that there is little cross-cutting judicial 
precedent that might provide guidance about the importance, meaning, 
or application of sound procedural norms. Without a common 
procedural baseline, judicial precedent addressing the procedural 
requirements in informal adjudication is sparse.178 This deprives courts, 
agencies, and scholars of the kind of robust, cross-cutting doctrinal law 
that has emerged in informal rulemaking. It makes it even more 
difficult to translate one agency’s experience with innovation into a 
lesson that can be efficiently exported to other agencies. Some 
flexibility in procedures can encourage experimentation and promote 
the development of better procedures over time. But that mechanism 
requires a common procedural baseline. Without it, judicial review 
cannot operate effectively to generate and disseminate information 
and experience across the vast expanse of the modern administrative 
state. This contributes to the opacity of adjudication procedures at both 
the program and system-wide levels, encouraging further specialization 
and siloing.179 
Finally, the exceptionalism norm facilitates neglect of the 
particular needs of quasi-judicial processes in an administrative 
context. The APA’s adjudication provisions were designed to attend to 
these needs. Congress’s non-APA design for PTAB adjudication 
illustrates the problems of ignoring them. The APA provides that the 
“presiding employee[]” in an adjudication must be the agency, an ALJ, 
or some other official as provided by Congress.180 The presiding 
employee issues an initial decision, and “[o]n appeal from or review of 
178. This is why administrative law textbooks include cases involving substantive review of 
informal adjudication in order to shed what minimal light is possible on the procedural 
requirements for such proceedings. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
484–85 (8th ed. 2019) (using Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), 
as the lead case for discussing procedural requirements in informal adjudication).
 179. Cf. Christopher J. Walker, The Costs of Immigration Exceptionalism, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 9, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-costs-of-immigration-
exceptionalism-by-chris-walker [https://perma.cc/USC2-QNGG] (“Because immigration 
exceptionalism encourages a myopic focus on immigration doctrine and scholarship, immigration 
scholars sometimes fail to tap into the wealth of knowledge in administrative law (and its 
regulatory subfields) to search for questions, answers, methodological approaches, and best 
practices to address systemic problems in immigration administration.”).
180. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(1), (3) (2018). The APA also allows “one or more members of the 
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the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have 
in making the initial decision” and may therefore decide the matter 
differently.181 This preservation of agency-head control recognizes that 
when an adjudication requires policymaking, the final authority to 
make the decision should be vested in the head of the agency.182 The 
PTAB structure failed to appreciate this unique need of administrative 
government. Congress created special presiding employees, APJs,183 as 
is expressly permitted by the APA. But their decisions are final— 
ultimate control is not vested in the head of the agency. This has 
created two problems. First, deprived of direct final authority, the 
agency has had to resort to panel stacking, which is inefficient and at 
least creates the appearance of illegitimacy.184 Second, the Federal 
Circuit has recently held that the APJs are principal officers who have 
been unconstitutionally appointed.185 If, as the APA contemplates, the 
APJ’s decisions were initial decisions subject to agency head control, 
this holding may not have been necessary.186 In short, two of the biggest 
administration problems the PTAB is currently facing seemingly could 
have been avoided if Congress had built upon the APA’s adjudication 
provisions instead of ignoring them and the institutional interests they 
were designed to protect. 
C. Capturing the Benefits of Exceptionalism
Adjudication’s exceptionalism norm also has benefits, the 
principal one being that it preserves flexibility for Congress and 
agencies to tailor procedural rules to fit the unique needs of individual 
programs. As explained in Part I, the world of agency adjudication is 
both vast and varied. Even if one narrows the focus to adjudication 
programs that involve an evidentiary hearing—Type A and Type B 
adjudication in Professor Asimow’s classification—there are hundreds 
of adjudication programs across the administrative state. And these 
programs vary along multiple dimensions, including hearing structure, 
regulatory purpose, caseload volume, issue complexity, judicial review 
structure, and significance of consequence for affected individuals. By 
 181. Id. § 557(b). 
 182. See Walker & Wasserman, supra note 83, at 144. 
 183. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
185.  Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
186. Brief Amicus Curiae of Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Neither Party at 7, 
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definition, the exceptionalism norm means that adjudication programs 
are mostly insulated from the demands of uniform, cross-cutting 
procedural requirements. Most are not subject to the APA’s 
requirements and need only meet the modest, highly flexible 
minimums of constitutional due process. This means that the law leaves 
maximum room available for the development and use of tailored 
adjudication procedures. 
But the ability to tailor procedures is instrumentally—not 
intrinsically—valuable. That is, it offers extrinsic benefits that may 
make it preferable to a regime dominated by uniform, cross-cutting187 
procedural requirements. At the simplest level, tailored procedures 
may offer greater efficiency within individual programs, as rules can be 
designed to account for the unique needs of a program or the 
characteristics of the population or industry that the program serves or 
regulates. Freedom from uniform requirements also expands the 
opportunities for procedural innovation in at least two ways. First, it 
expands the range of options that are available with respect to each 
discrete element of the process. For instance, in the absence of a cross-
cutting prohibition on ex parte contacts, an agency that administers a 
Type B adjudication program can choose whether to prohibit or 
regulate ex parte contacts and also enjoys seemingly unfettered 
discretion if it chooses to design an ex parte prohibition or 
regulation.188 Second, the absence of a cross-cutting, uniform minimum 
prevents lock-in. If an element of the process does not work as initially 
designed or conditions change after the procedure has been adopted, 
it will be easier to make the changes necessary to address the problem. 
Thus, in the substantial space of rulemaking where the APA’s ex parte 
provision does not apply, the Federal Communications Commission 
187. In the civil procedure literature, “trans-substantive” appears to be the preferred term, 
but “cross-cutting” is more appropriate in the administrative context. Although uniform 
administrative procedures are trans-substantive because they apply across various areas of 
substantive law, they are also “trans-institutional,” because they apply across agencies that vary 
from one another in terms of size, structure, powers, and purposes. “Cross-cutting” is intended to 
capture both of these characteristics. 
188. In Type A adjudications, the APA’s ex parte prohibition applies. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) 
(2018). In Type B adjudications, the relevant minimum is supplied by constitutional due process, 
see supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text, and Congress and agencies often do not include ex 
parte prohibitions in the Type B procedures, see  ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
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(“FCC”) has been able to design and redesign its ex parte 
procedures.189 
In theory, by providing space for institutions to experiment with 
new and innovative procedures, exceptionalism may have system-wide 
benefits.190 Realizing this benefit requires at least three steps. First, the 
freedom from uniform, cross-cutting requirements must be used to 
experiment thoughtfully with new and different procedures. Second, 
the lessons learned through the experiments must be captured. 
Experience with retrospective rulemaking and pilot projects in 
substantive areas of regulation suggest that both of these steps are 
easier to acknowledge than they are to complete.191 These steps of the 
process may themselves require significant planning and some 
dedication of resources that might also be needed in other areas.192 
Finally, even if experiments are properly conducted and their lessons 
adequately captured, systemic benefit further requires both a 
mechanism and a will to disseminate the knowledge throughout the 
system. Even if these steps are not perfectly or consistently observed, 
some systemic benefit may be realized. And the alternative of imposing 
procedural uniformity might squelch this process, thereby stunting the 
systemic evolution of better procedures.193 
But system-wide procedural improvement is only possible if 
exceptionalism creates the conditions necessary to support it. For 
reasons that have been previously discussed, this seems unlikely.194 
189. The D.C. Circuit has ruled, controversially, that the APA’s ex parte prohibition in 
§ 557(d) applies to certain “quasi-adjudicatory” rulemakings. See ESA L. SFERRA-BONISTALLI,
EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS IN INFORMAL RULEMAKING: FINAL REPORT 24–37 (2014), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2014-4%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9V23-ZK4X] (summarizing the D.C. Circuit’s caselaw applying the APA’s ex parte provisions in 
informal rulemaking). In response to these rulings, the FCC adopted procedural regulations 
governing ex parte communications. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200–.1216 (2019); Regulations 
Concerning Ex Parte Communications and Presentations in Commission Proceedings, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 21,051 (June 4, 1987). These were most recently revised in 2011. See Commission’s Ex Parte 
Rules and Other Procedural Rules, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,376 (May 2, 2011). 
 190. Cf. Schlam, supra note 142, at 188 (“Uniform laws . . . can have the undesirable effect of 
disrupting the desirable, natural evolution of an area of substantive law.”).
 191. See, e.g., ACUS Recommendation 2014-5: Retrospective Review of Agency Rules, 79 
Fed. Reg. 75,114 (Dec. 17, 2014) (recommending that agencies seek to encourage a culture of 
retrospective review within agencies in order to overcome these challenges); Colleen V. Chien, 
Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, 104 IOWA L.REV. 2313, 
2319 (2019) (challenging the “perceived legal, institutional, and informational barriers to the use 
of rigorous policy pilots”). 
 192. See, e.g., ACUS Recommendation 2014-5, 79 Fed. Reg. at 75,114. 
 193. See McCaskill, supra note 162, at 148. 
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Adjudication’s exceptionalism norm wholly rejects a common 
procedural baseline and produces a profoundly nontransparent system. 
These conditions are antithetical to procedural evolution. 
Another potential systemic benefit of adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm is that it shifts responsibility for procedural 
design away from the courts and toward Congress and agencies. To the 
extent that the norm is grounded in the minimalist nature of 
constitutional due process requirements, it empowers both Congress 
and agencies.195  To the extent that exceptionalism is grounded in 
legislative and judicial reluctance to require agencies to comply with 
the APA’s adjudication requirements, the more profound shift is 
toward administrative agencies. In either event, this institutional shift 
offers several possible derivative benefits. One is to improve 
democratic accountability as procedural design choices are shifted 
from unelected judges to Congress, the president, and agencies.196 
Relatedly, it may be more legitimate to vest authority for procedural 
design in the institutions responsible for creating and administering the 
various adjudication programs. These institutions may also have a 
comparative institutional advantage over the courts when it comes to 
designing adjudication procedures. This benefit may especially accrue 
with respect to the shift of authority to the agencies, wherein the 
greatest subject-matter expertise may reside. The agency that 
administers an adjudication program is likely to have the best 
information and experience with the industry or populations it 
regulates or serves and may also have a more thorough understanding 
of and dedication to the substantive goals that the adjudication 
program is supposed to serve. Finally, shifting authority away from the 
courts may prevent or reduce the increased costs and delays that are 
associated with the judiciary’s contribution to the ossification of the 
informal rulemaking process.197 
 195. See Vermeule, supra note 149, at 1891.
 196. See id. at 1894–95; cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated 
Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 394 (1987) (identifying courts as 
“the least politically accountable branch of government”).
197. “Ossification” refers to the hypothesis that the accretion of additional requirements, 
imposed by courts, the Executive, and Congress on the rulemaking process, have slowed down 
that process and undermined its usefulness. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify 
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 71 (1995); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume
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D. Summary and Conclusion 
Overall, the benefits of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm are 
outweighed by its costs, particularly when the question is considered in 
system-wide perspective.198 On one side of the ledger, individual 
agencies and programs benefit from the ability to tailor adjudication 
procedures. But this comes at a significant cost to individual interests 
and institutional integrity, undermining transparency, efficiency, 
accountability, and legitimacy in the system as a whole. The potential 
system-wide benefits of the procedural experimentation facilitated by 
the exceptionalism norm are unlikely to be realized because the norm 
itself impedes the dissemination of the useful information that might 
be generated through experimentation. Moreover, the exceptionalism 
norm both rejects a uniform metric for assessing the adequacy of 
adjudication procedures and makes it extremely difficult to get 
complete and reliable information about actual procedures. All actors 
in the system—agencies, courts, Congress, practitioners, scholars, and 
affected individuals—are thereby denied the information needed to 
understand, evaluate, and improve agency adjudication. The situation 
should be intolerable in light of the large size, broad scope, and 
importance of adjudication to individual programs and to the 
administrative enterprise as a whole. 
It would be a mistake, however, to simplistically conclude that 
adjudication’s exceptionalism norm should be discarded in favor of 
rigid procedural uniformity. Complete uniformity in adjudication 
198. There are several different metrics for evaluating a procedural system. Robert G. Bone, 
The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural 
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 919 (1999). Some have argued that protection for individual rights 
should outweigh efficiency. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
305–06 (2004); cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto 
Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 331 (2003) (“[W]e advance 
the thesis that social policies, notably, legal rules, should be selected entirely with regard to their 
effects on the well-being of individuals.”). I have used a cost-benefit approach to evaluating 
adjudication procedures in this piece, as I have done in previous work. See Bremer, Designing the 
Decider, supra note 23, at 81; Bremer, Exceptionalism Norm, supra note 1, at 1356. This approach 
is consistent with the “fact-intensive cost-benefit analysis” the Supreme Court has used to 
evaluate what procedures are required to satisfy constitutional due process. Parkin, supra note 
28, at 1119; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). It is also consistent with the broader 
acceptance in administrative law of cost-benefit analysis as a useful analytical tool. See, e.g., 
Richard B. Stewart, Essay, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 444 (2003) (noting that cost-benefit analysis has “become widely accepted” in regulatory 
administration); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 
1060 (2000) (explaining the traditional economic justifications for cost-benefit analysis and 
suggesting that it “is best defended as a means of overcoming predictable problems in individual 





    
     
 
    
2020] ADJUDICATION’S EXCEPTIONALISM NORM 1791  
procedures is neither desirable nor achievable. As the cross section 
provided in Part I demonstrates, adjudication programs are highly 
variable and have different needs and goals. Some variation or tailoring 
in procedures is needed to accommodate these differences and 
facilitate more efficient and effective administration of adjudication 
programs. In addition, procedure is not costless, nor does it necessarily 
provide valuable protection in all circumstances. This recognition is 
part of what has led the Supreme Court to take a flexible, balancing 
approach to determining what constitutional due process requires.199 
Courts and scholars have mostly preferred, in the context of non-APA 
adjudication, to leave that analysis to politically accountable 
institutions and particularly to the agencies themselves.200 But this 
delegation of a highly flexible analysis to agencies has significantly 
contributed to adjudication’s exceptionalism norm and to the 
atomization of adjudication procedures throughout the administrative 
state. One need not think that absolute uniformity is desirable to 
acknowledge that the experiment in radical disuniformity has failed. 
A more productive approach would recognize that uniformity and 
specialization are not mutually exclusive goals but rather values that 
should be thoughtfully balanced in any system of legal rules. The 
literature and experience in other areas of the law attest to this. As 
Professor Amanda Frost has persuasively argued, lawyers have 
sometimes wrongly treated uniformity as a self-evident good, 
unthinkingly pursuing it at any cost.201 Administrative law has made the 
inverse error in the context of adjudication procedures. Institutions 
and actors throughout the system—courts, agencies, the executive, 
Congress, and scholars—have operated as if specialization is a self-
evident good to be unthinkingly pursued at any cost. The result is 
adjudication’s exceptionalism norm. By definition, this norm 
prioritizes specialization and rejects all attempts to establish or enforce 
cross-cutting, uniform procedures in agency adjudication.
Administrative law should discard adjudication’s exceptionalism 
norm in favor of a regime designed to balance uniformity and 
specialization. The next Part turns to the questions of what such a 
regime might look like and how it can be achieved.
 199. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
 200. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 739, 793–96 (1976); Vermeule, supra note 149, at 1891.
 201. Frost, supra note 143, at 1579.
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III. TOWARD A REMEDY
Further complicating this analysis is the availability of two distinct 
but overlapping possible remedies: the enforcement of minimum 
procedural requirements and the pursuit of broader uniformity. This 
Part argues in favor of a solution at the intersection of these 
possibilities. As in rulemaking procedures, a balance between 
uniformity and specialization can best be struck by requiring uniform 
minimum procedural requirements that all agencies are required to 
observe in adjudication. But these minimums should be relatively 
limited, only protecting the most fundamental individual and 
institutional interests implicated in adjudicatory hearings across the 
vast expanse of the administrative state. Decades of agency experience 
and ACUS’s extensive study of the present state of agency adjudication 
suggest that these minimum requirements should apply in evidentiary 
hearings.202 The APA’s adjudication provisions offer an excellent 
starting point for determining the content of these minimum 
procedural requirements, although some amendments might be 
appropriate to reflect the lessons learned over the many decades since 
the APA was enacted. Finally, administrative law’s standard narrative 
offers a sound template for addressing the question of which institution 
should be responsible for enforcing the suggested regime. As in 
rulemaking and judicial review, this should be a three-branch effort. 
Congress should enact a statute clarifying that the APA’s 
requirements—potentially with amendments—apply to all evidentiary 
hearings conducted in agency adjudication programs. The courts 
should enforce these provisions uniformly across all agencies, over 
time developing a body of judicial precedent that will provide broadly 
useful guidance interpreting the requirements. Finally, agencies should 
use their discretion to innovate beyond the minimum requirements, 
fine-tuning the balance between uniformity and specialization in 
adjudication procedures. 
A. The Overarching Structure 
The first step toward remedying the harms of adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm is to identify an overarching procedural structure 
capable of striking a better balance between uniformity and 
specialization in agency adjudication. Striking such a balance requires 
the application of uniform, cross-cutting procedural minimums 
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designed to allow an appropriate degree of tailoring and innovation to 
suit the genuine needs of different adjudication programs. The goal 
should be to improve transparency and protect reasonable individual 
expectations of procedural justice by specifying minimum 
requirements that apply across adjudication programs. These 
minimum requirements should be designed and enforced in a way that 
produces a clear and stable definition of what “adjudication” is and 
how it is conducted. At the same time, the regime should be designed 
to accommodate the agencies’ traditional authority to tailor 
procedures beyond the applicable statutory minimums.203 First, this 
means that the procedural requirements should not address 
nonessential matters that do not need to be uniformly addressed. It 
also means the regime should tolerate and even encourage agencies to 
thoughtfully tailor their procedural rules beyond the applicable 
minimums.204 
This overarching structure should be familiar: it is a structure 
similar to the one that governs notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Although rulemaking is not without its problems, it offers a reasonable 
template for improving the balance between uniformity and 
exceptionalism in adjudication. In informal rulemaking, there is 
sufficient uniformity and clarity in the applicable cross-cutting 
minimum requirements to define what “rulemaking” is and to specify 
how it must be conducted.205 This clarity makes the work of all branches 
easier and more efficient. Congress can grant an agency new regulatory 
responsibility without having to design a wholly new procedural regime 
for the required rulemaking. The agency knows just what procedures 
it must follow and has access to a body of judicial precedent that will 
answer many of its questions about how to interpret the APA. It can 
spend less time fashioning new procedures from whole cloth or figuring 
out how to adhere to a wholly new procedure established by statute 
and can spend more time fulfilling its substantive statutory mandate. 
At the same time, it can use its procedural discretion to tailor the 
 203. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978). 
204. This encouragement could be accomplished by judicial recognition of agency procedural 
discretion beyond the applicable procedural minima, see id., as well as through more proactive 
means through institutions such as ACUS, see, e.g., ACUS Recommendation 2016-4: Evidentiary 
Hearings Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016); 
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MODEL ADJUDICATION RULES (2018) [hereinafter ACUS
MODEL ADJUDICATION RULES], https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Model%20Adjudication%20Rules%209.13.18%20ACUS_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QEB-5GHV].
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process beyond the minimums. Regulatory parties and third-party 
beneficiaries of the rulemaking know what to expect of the rulemaking 
process and, even if the agency tailors that process somewhat, it 
remains clear how best to convey information and arguments to the 
agency. A court, on judicial review of the agency’s final rule, will find 
itself in familiar procedural territory, allowing the judges to fairly and 
efficiently adjudicate procedural challenges and reserving time and 
energy for more substantive concerns. Establishing a similar regime in 
adjudication would convey like benefits to all branches of government 
and to individuals who appear before agencies, whether as 
representatives or otherwise. 
To establish a similar regime in adjudication, it would be necessary 
to identify the category of adjudications that would be subject to the 
minimum requirements. This could be a difficult task. Administrative 
law has long operated under the assumption that the APA already 
makes such a clear distinction, subjecting “formal” adjudication to its 
minimum procedural requirements while leaving agencies to 
determine the procedures that will apply in “informal” adjudication.206 
In making this determination, agencies need only comply with the 
modest and flexible demands of constitutional due process.207 In fact, 
the formal–informal dichotomy is both unstable and misleading.208 In 
practice, there has emerged a large middle category of adjudications 
that are classified as “informal” because they are not subject to the 
APA’s adjudication provisions, but which nonetheless entail 
evidentiary hearings conducted according to tailored procedures that 
are as or more “formal,” in the colloquial sense of trial-like, than the 
APA’s procedures.209 If the APA’s original formal–informal division 
has not succeeded, does that suggest that it is not possible to develop a 
clear, stable classification of the hearings that should be subject to 
uniform, minimum procedural requirements? 
Decades of agency experience in adjudication fortunately offer an 
answer to this question: the procedural minimums should apply to 
evidentiary hearings conducted by administrative agencies. The careful 
work that ACUS and Professor Asimow have done cataloging agency 
 206. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2018). 
 207. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 208. See ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 3; Bremer, Exceptionalism
Norm, supra note 1, at 1381–82. 
 209. ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 3. 
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adjudication programs suggests that this approach would accord with 
the existing reality of adjudication. 
B. The Minimum Requirements 
Within this proposed overarching structure of adjudication 
procedures, what minimum requirements should apply? As an initial 
and perhaps all-too-obvious matter, the uniformity sought by the 
proposed regime would be exclusively procedural and would not reach 
the substantive principles that agencies enforce through 
adjudication.210 The minimum requirements should be designed to 
protect the most fundamental individual rights affected by agency 
adjudication. At least with respect to such rights, minimum procedural 
requirements would prevent Congress and agencies from using 
procedural manipulation to achieve substantive policy goals. If the 
procedures are confined to protecting the most important individual 
interests—for example, the rights to notice of the proceedings, to an 
impartial decisionmaker, to present or rebut evidence, to a written 
decision, and to appeal—the result should not be objectionable. 
Individual interests so fundamental should not be sacrificed because of 
a desire to achieve through procedure what cannot be achieved directly 
through the substantive law. Adjudication’s exceptionalism norm has 
allowed too much latitude for such trade-offs. The consequence is that 
seemingly practical and relatively harmless tactics in one regime can 
easily be used in other programs with more objectionable 
consequences. For example, the PTAB has been criticized for using its 
procedural discretion to stack panels to achieve results in individual 
cases that are desirable as a matter of substantive patent law.211 In the 
context of immigration adjudication, however, a similarly expansive 
understanding of agency procedural discretion can be used to 
undermine an immigrant’s right to an impartial decisionmaker. The 
consequences here are manifestly more serious: deportation back to a 
country where the immigrant may face anything from undesirable 
living conditions to the possibility or even probability of a violent 
 210. Cf. Burbank, The Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 140, at 542 n.30 (“As 
Professor Bone maintains, the common view that procedure was independent of substantive law 
‘implied that procedural rules could and should be general in nature and “trans-
substantive.”’”(quoting Bone, Making Effective Rules, supra note 140, at 324)). 
 211. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. The difficulty for PTAB could be 
addressed by observing the APA’s provision for agency head control over final adjudication 
decisions. Such control may have the added benefit of curing the recently identified constitutional 
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death. The question of what protection should be afforded to the most 
fundamental of rights in adjudication should be made on a system-wide 
basis, based on information about the wide range of possibilities, and 
at least comparatively isolated from the political pressures exerted by 
substantive regulatory concerns. 
The simplest course would be to use the minimum procedural 
requirements that are established by the APA’s adjudication 
provisions. Concerns about agency adjudication were a primary 
motivating factor in the APA’s adoption,212 and the compromise 
ultimately struck in the statute deserves to be given full effect. The 
APA’s procedures are also relatively minimal, as compared against the 
range of procedures that agencies can and do use in adjudication.213 
Because the APA’s procedures are already enacted, it would be
relatively easy to enforce them. This would obviate the need to start 
from scratch and pursue a new and sure to be equally fierce 
compromise.214 
But it may make sense to make modest revisions to the APA’s 
adjudication provisions. Decades of agency experience offer a wealth 
of information about the needs of adjudicating agencies, as well as 
indications as to what derailed the APA’s initial promise in this 
important realm. Practical difficulties and costs associated with the use 
of ALJs appear to be principal causes of the APA’s failure.215 Much of 
the problem here can be attributed to the agencies’ dissatisfaction with 
the Office of Personnel Management’s (“OPM”) ALJ examination, 
registry, and other aspects of its management of the ALJ program.216 
A recent executive order has significantly reduced OPM’s role.217 It is 
 212. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–41 (1950); Lubbers, supra note 19, at 
65. 
 213. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2018), with ACUS Recommendation 2016-4: Evidentiary 
Hearings Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314, 94,315–16 
(Dec. 23, 2016).
 214. See Shepherd, supra note 5, at 1559–60.
 215. See Funk, The Rise and Purported Demise of Wong Yang Sung, supra note 15, at 893; 
William Funk, Slip Slidin’ Away: The Erosion of APA Adjudication, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 141, 
142 (2017) [hereinafter Funk, Slip Slidin’ Away]; Lubbers, supra note 19, at 72–74. 
 216. See generally VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW (2010) (documenting the history of problems 
with OPM’s management of the ALJ certification and selection process); see also EEOCREPORT, 
supra note 74, at 3 (“If the Commission decided to use ALJs instead of AJs, it would have to 
accept the attendant limitations on its authority over the compensation and tenure of its 
adjudicators.”). 
 217. See Exec. Order No. 13,843, 3 C.F.R. §§ 844, 845–46 (2019). OPM is currently revising 
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possible that this change may make agencies more amenable to 
adjudicating under the APA, although ALJs will remain more costly 
under the new regime.218 On another note, the regime would operate 
better if the APA’s definition of “adjudication” or “hearing on the 
record” was amended and clarified.219 This could help to ensure that 
the APA’s procedures are enforced in the proceedings in which 
Congress intends for them to apply. 
C. The Institutional Question 
If minimum procedures are to be imposed upon adjudication 
programs across the federal government, which institution should be 
responsible for the project? Several routes to reform are possible: 
voluntary agency action, unilateral judicial decree, or legislative action. 
This Section evaluates these options, each of which has advantages and 
disadvantages. It concludes that the best route forward would involve 
all the institutions of government. As in other areas of the 
administrative state’s unwritten constitution, the development and 
enforcement of procedural minimums in adjudication should be an 
interbranch endeavor.220 
Perhaps the easiest course would be to encourage administrative 
agencies to use the significant procedural discretion afforded by the 
exceptionalism norm to adopt minimum procedures and related best 
practices in individual adjudication programs. The Administrative 
Conference has already undertaken several projects in this vein. In 
1993, the Administrative Conference produced a set of Model 
Adjudication Rules221 that various agencies have consulted in 
generally OPM, Fact Sheet: Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) Positions, 
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/fact-sheet-administrative-
law-judge-alj-positions-posted.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7MV-TP9S] (Aug. 8, 2019) (explaining 
OPM’s role with respect to ALJ positions following the issuance of the executive order and until 
the agency adopts new regulations). As of April 14, 2020, OPM has not proposed new ALJ 
regulations. 
 218. See EEOCREPORT, supra note 74, at 43–44. ALJs are paid on a special pay scale that is 
generally higher than the General Schedule pay scale. Id. at app. D. The costs of using ALJs may 
thus be quite a bit higher than the costs of using non-ALJ adjudicators. See id. at 46. 
 219. See, e.g., ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 7 (discussing the “gray 
area” under current definitions). Scholars have argued that the APA’s definitions have other 
problems too. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s Definition of 
“Rule,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1077, 1079 (2004). 
 220. See Bremer, Unwritten Administrative Constitution, supra note 2, at 1250–52. 
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developing adjudication procedures.222  It revised these rules in 2018.223 
In addition, the Conference’s study of federal adjudication programs 
has produced several recommendations, including one that identifies 
best practices for agency adjudication.224 The principal advantage of 
this approach is that it requires neither legislative nor judicial action to 
be implemented.225 This approach would also retain adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm, and it would necessarily be more incremental. 
Although it may improve adjudication procedures in various, discrete 
respects, it is not likely to address the systemic costs of exceptionalism. 
Procedural change would be most unlikely in the areas where it is most 
needed—that is, where there is significant political pressure to relax 
individual protections in the name of substantive policy goals. The 
transparency problems created by exceptionalism would not be 
remedied by this approach, nor would a foundation be provided for the 
development of a cross-cutting, widely accessible body of judicial 
precedent interpreting procedural minimums. The procedural 
experimentation and improvement that measured uniformity could 
bring would likely not materialize. 
A second route to reform would be for the courts to enforce the 
APA’s adjudication provisions, particularly the triggering language of 
§ 554, more strictly.226 This could be done as a purely statutory matter 
or the Supreme Court could revive the never-overruled Wong Yang 
Sung doctrine, according to which the APA’s adjudication provisions 
define the constitutional minimum for due process in agency 
adjudication.227  This approach has more advantages than the first 
option: It would give effect to the APA’s initial compromise, thereby 
fulfilling its superstatute promises and bringing adjudication in line 
 222. See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. 39,057, 39,058, 39,063, 39,067 (June 29, 2012) (Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau); 83 Fed. Reg. 18,866, 18,872 (Apr. 29, 1996) (Federal Highway 
Administration). 
 223. ACUS MODEL ADJUDICATION RULES, supra note 204. 
 224. E.g., ACUS Recommendation 2016-4: Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314, 94,315–16 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
225. An adjudicating agency can develop its procedures with minimal public involvement 
since both procedural regulations and guidance are exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment 
rulemaking requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018) (“[T]his subsection does not apply . . . 
to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, 
or practice . . . .”). This may undercut the proposition that vesting procedural design choices in 
the agency necessarily advances democratic accountability. 
 226. See ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, supra note 24, at 7.
 227. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950); Funk, The Rise and 
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with the standard narrative of administrative law that is well 
established in rulemaking and judicial review.228 It would also move the 
needle sharply away from the exceptionalism norm, improving the 
balance between uniformity and specialization. Agencies would be 
required, in a judicially enforceable way, to adhere to the APA’s 
uniform requirements, and many of the benefits of uniformity would 
thereby be achieved. One potential problem, however, is that courts 
might underenforce the APA, finding it inapplicable in many of the 
programs that involve evidentiary hearings. Another disadvantage is 
that the courts must take the APA as it stands and could not make any 
needed or desired modifications to its procedures. Even if courts were 
authorized to modify the APA, they are institutionally ill-suited to do 
so.229 
A third route to reform runs through the legislature. Over the 
years, a number of scholars and experts have encouraged Congress to 
reform the APA’s adjudication provisions. For example, the ABA has 
frequently urged Congress to take legislative action to promote 
uniformity in administrative adjudication through greater observance 
of the APA’s adjudication provisions. Some resolutions have urged 
agency-specific legislation to impose the APA’s procedures on discrete 
adjudicatory programs.230 Other resolutions have contemplated 
broader legislative reform. In July 2000, the ABA adopted Resolution 
113, which asked Congress to amend the APA to ensure that the 
observance of the APA’s adjudication provisions would be required 
absent express exception in all future agency-specific statutes 
contemplating an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing.231 And in 
 228. Cf. Kovacs, supra note 4, at 1248 (“[S]uperstatute theory supports stricter adherence to 
the text of the APA and allegiance to the compromises encoded in that text.”). 
229. Courts are “ill equipped to gather the range of empirical data, and lack[] the practical 
experience, that should be brought to bear on the questions of policy, procedural and 
substantive,” and “[i]ndividual litigation under Article III is even more obviously inadequate for 
the policy choices implicated in considering standards for the adequacy of pleadings on a 
transsubstantive basis.” Burbank, The Dilemmas of “General Rules,” supra note 140, at 537.
 230. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 124 (2011) [hereinafter RESOLUTION 124], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_124.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5QFW-V7D2] (urging Congress to require EEOC to observe APA-formal procedures in 
employment discrimination hearings).
 231. AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 113 (2000), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law_judiciary/resolution_113.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
W7HK-9XBS]. ABA resolutions are typically developed by the organization’s various sections, 
each of which has a particular subject matter as its specialty. The sections produce a report 
analyzing the issues and prepares a draft resolution. In the absence of objections from other 
sections of the ABA, the draft resolution and report are sent to the House of Delegates for 
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February 2005, the ABA adopted Resolution 114, which adopted 
Professor Asimow’s classification scheme for administrative 
adjudication232 and urged Congress to modernize the APA to extend 
certain “fair hearings provisions” of the APA to all Type A and Type 
B adjudications and to give preference to the use of ALJs to preside 
over evidentiary hearings conducted by administrative agencies.233 In 
total, the ABA has adopted a half dozen resolutions promoting APA 
adjudication since 1983.234 Over the years, scholars have similarly urged 
Congress to take action to legislatively enforce the APA’s promise of 
uniform norms and minimum procedures in administrative 
adjudication.235 
As with the other reform alternatives, the legislative route offers 
both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that it offers the 
possibility of a single, potentially comprehensive solution. Although it 
is often difficult to get Congress to act, recent interest in APA 
modernization236 may suggest that legislative reform has a greater 
chance of success now than it did in the past. On the other hand, recent 
APA reform efforts have mostly focused on the more salient contexts 
of rulemaking and judicial review of agency action.237 As ever, recent 
bills have largely neglected adjudication.238 The extraordinary diversity 
consideration, debate, and a vote at meetings held semi-annually. Most of the resolutions 
discussed here were prepared through the ABA’s Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory 
Practice. 
 232. See Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella, supra note 19, at 1004.
 233. AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 114 (2005) [hereinafter RESOLUTION 114], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2005_my_114.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4U5U-C65F].
 234. See  RESOLUTION 124, supra note 230 (noting resolutions adopted in 1983, 1989, 1998, 
2000, 2005, and 2011). 
 235. See, e.g., Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella, supra note 19, at 1008–09; Funk, Slip Slidin’ 
Away, supra note 215, at 182; Lubbers, supra note 19, at 76–80; Whiteside, supra note 19, at 373– 
79. 
 236. See, e.g., RESOLUTION 114, supra note 233; Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2017) [hereinafter Walker, Modernizing 
the APA]. 
 237. See Walker, Modernizing the APA, supra note 236, at 638–70. 
 238. See, e.g., Midnight Rules Relief Act of 2017, S. 34, 115th Cong. (2017); Midnight Rules 
Relief Act of 2017, H.R. 21, 115th Cong. (2017); One In, One Out Act, H.R. 674, 115th Cong. 
(2017); RED Tape Act of 2017, S. 56, 115th Cong. (2017); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, 
H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017); Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, S. 
21, 115th Cong. (2017); Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 
115th Cong. (2017); Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2017, S. 119, 115th 
Cong. (2017); Sunshine for Regulations and Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2017, 
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among adjudicatory agencies and programs makes the problem 
unwieldy and deprives the effort of a cohesive group of interests that 
might act together to enact the needed legislation.239 In short, the very 
problem in need of legislative solution—exceptionalism—may make 
that solution less likely. Even if Congress enacted a well-designed bill, 
the reform effort could flounder subsequently. There would be the 
danger that courts might nullify it by interpreting it in an overly narrow 
way that would preserve the status quo.240 There would also be the 
danger that Congress could undermine the effort by continuing to do 
what it has done since the APA’s passage: ignore the default rules in 
favor of creating unique adjudicatory procedures tailored to suit the 
needs of individual agencies and regulatory programs.241 
The best approach to remedying the harms of adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm might also be the most difficult to achieve: an 
interbranch effort to bring adjudication in line with administrative 
law’s standard narrative.242 In this ideal world, Congress would 
statutorily clarify the APA’s definition of “adjudication,” at least by 
specifying that the APA’s procedures apply to evidentiary hearings in 
agency adjudication.243 In so doing, it would also consider tweaking the 
APA’s procedures to address problems that might interfere with the 
success of the reinvigorated statutory mandate. As in rulemaking, the 
minimum requirements could be confined to the hearing stage of the 
process. Agencies could then be afforded broad discretion in the pre-
and post-hearing stages, subject to limited provisions governing 
appeals and final decisionmaking authority.244 The courts would 
 239. See Bremer, Designing the Decider, supra note 23, at 84. 
 240. Cf. Andrew Hessick, Legislative Efforts To Overturn Chevron, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 19, 2016), https://yalejreg.com/nc/legislative-efforts-to-overturn-
chevron-by-andy-hessick [https://perma.cc/EKR5-MWSB] (“If Chevron deference were 
abolished, many judges would likely find other ways to defer to agencies.”).
 241. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306 (1955). 
 242. See Bremer, Unwritten Administrative Constitution, supra note 2, at 1257; cf. Jeffrey A. 
Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 918 (2020) (“[T]he 
development and rise of the Fourth Branch was a three-branch enterprise. . . . [A]ny durable 
return to [original constitutional norms] will also have to be a three-branch project . . . .”).
243. A more elaborate approach, which has some precedent in state APAs, would be to 
define several classes of adjudications, specifying minimum procedures tailored to suit each class. 
See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 
320–25 (1986). 
244. ACUS is currently studying intra-agency appeals processes in adjudication. Asimow, 
Best Practices, supra note 127, at 960–64; Agency Appellate Systems, ADMIN. CONF. U.S.,
https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/agency-appellate-systems [https://perma.cc/T7GH-G286]; 
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interpret the statutory provisions, affording no deference to individual 
agencies’ non-expert interpretation of the APA and enforcing the 
APA’s minimum procedural requirements uniformly across 
agencies.245 Over time, the courts would develop a body of precedent 
interpreting these minimum procedural requirements while also 
endeavoring not to impose procedures that Congress has not 
required.246 Agencies would scrupulously observe the statutory 
requirements and use procedural discretion to thoughtfully tailor 
procedures beyond the minimums in a manner that will satisfy any 
unique programmatic needs.247 
Abandoning the exceptionalism norm in favor of this approach 
would produce a better balance between uniformity and specialization 
in adjudication procedures. It would also conform adjudication to the 
standard narrative of administrative law that presently governs 
rulemaking and judicial review. 
IV. OBJECTIONS
This Article has argued against a broad and powerful status quo, 
urging that administrative law should reject a pervasive norm of 
exceptionalism that emerged through the conduct of all three branches 
of government and has prevailed over hundreds of adjudication 
programs for many decades. Of course, there are reasons why this 
norm emerged and has proven durable. And there are reasons why 
well-informed and well-intentioned people may object to its 
abandonment. This Part identifies some of these objections and offers 
some response to them. More could—and should—be said. 
Recognizing that reality, this Part is intended to provoke further 
discussion. 
First, some may object that adjudication programs are so varied 
that the application of minimum procedures would be at best ill-
advised and at worst harmful or impossible. As demonstrated in Part I, 
see also Walker & Wasserman, supra note 83, at 174–78 (discussing the APA’s direction that final 
decisionmaking authority in adjudication will be vested in the agency head).
 245. See Kovacs, supra note 4, at 1244. Judicial review is necessary because “the lack of a 
single appellate authority to iron out idiosyncratic interpretations of the uniform rules would 
make the uniformity more theoretical than real.” Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form 
of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO.WASH.L.REV. 1683, 1786 (1992). 
 246. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978). 
 247. Cf. Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 138, at 539 n.119 (highlighting how a 
discretionary scheme permits wide variation of procedures in practice).
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there is broad diversity across adjudication programs and the agencies 
that administer them. This first appears to be an environment not 
readily susceptible to successful governance through uniform 
procedural rules. The example set by agency rulemaking, however, 
offers a compelling counterpoint. There are vast differences across 
agencies that conduct rulemakings—in terms of the structures of the 
regulating agencies, the subjects and scope of the regulatory programs, 
the characteristics of the affected industries, and the salience of the 
issues to the public.248 And yet agency rulemaking is conducted in 
accord with a core set of uniform, cross-cutting procedural 
requirements that have been broadly internalized by all institutions 
within the federal government. These minimum requirements offer 
uniformity that benefits the system while preserving flexibility for 
agencies to tailor procedures to suit the needs of individual 
rulemakings. They have provided a foundation for development of a 
robust body of administrative common law and a sophisticated regime 
of executive review. Indeed, by focusing attention on procedural 
commonality, the administrative law of rulemaking may actually help 
to downplay the differences across regulatory agencies and programs. 
In contrast, adjudication’s exceptionalism norm obscures points of 
commonality and emphasizes difference. A concerted effort to forge a 
workable and uniform adjudication procedure with sufficient flexibility 
to accommodate genuine programmatic needs could help to reverse 
this unfortunate circumstance, benefiting agencies, the public, and the 
administrative state as a whole. 
Another objection may be that the APA’s formal procedures are 
too onerous and would impede efficient administration in adjudication 
programs.249 Relatedly, the proposed remedy would result in the kind 
of ossification that has impaired the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process.250 The first variant of this objection seems unlikely given that 
most Type B agencies observe procedures that are as or more formal 
than the ones that the APA requires. Moreover, as Part I.C
demonstrated, the exceptionalism norm facilitates widespread failures 
to observe fundamental procedures necessary to protect individual 
rights and institutional integrity. Given these significant harms, the 
 248. See, e.g., POTTER, supra note 176, at 15–16. 
 249. See ASIMOW, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, supra note 18, at 18; Gary 
J. Edles, An APA-Default Presumption for Administrative Hearings: Some Thoughts on 
“Ossifying” the Adjudication Process, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 814 (2003).
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proponents of exceptionalism should carry the burden of 
demonstrating that the norm’s benefits are worth its costs. But the 
exceptionalism norm has emerged in piecemeal fashion over many 
decades without such a systemwide plan or defense. The second variant 
of this objection requires more careful consideration, but it may be that 
rulemaking, a process through which broad policies are developed, will 
prove more susceptible to ossification than adjudication, a process 
through which those broad policies are brought to bear on individual 
cases. Even if ossification occurred to some degree, that might be 
acceptable. Procedure is never costless, and the right question is always 
whether the costs of the provided procedures are worth the benefits. 
Finally, it bears noting even in the rulemaking context, some do not 
accept the ossification thesis251 and others view the phenomenon as 
beneficial.252 
A third difficulty is that there are hundreds of adjudication 
programs throughout the federal government that are currently 
conducted according to tailored procedures,253 and some may argue 
that it would be impractical or impossible to impose a new procedural 
regime on all of these programs. This is a genuine challenge, but one 
that sounds in practicality and not principle. One way to address it 
would be to take the path the ABA has recommended: to apply the 
new regime only to new programs on a prospective basis. This option 
is superficially attractive but would not address the problems this 
Article has identified. The pressure exerted by retaining 
exceptionalism in the vast majority of programs would seem likely to 
imperil the prospective compromise. More importantly, there are 
always costs associated with legal change.254 Here, the costs are worth 
the change. And over time, for the reasons articulated above, the costs 
would dissipate and be replaced by the benefits of increased 
uniformity. 
Finally, other fields, most notably civil procedure, have recently 
seen a push towards greater specialization,255 and some may therefore 
 251. E.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 197, at 1421 (“[E]vidence that ossification is either a 
serious or widespread problem is mixed and relatively weak.”).
 252. E.g., Nielson, Optimal Ossification, supra note 149, at 1231 (“In short, delay—but not 
too much delay—can be good for purposes of legitimacy.”). 
 253. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
254. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 793 (2002). 
 255. E.g., Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, supra note 138, at 539 n.119 (“State procedural 
variation is wide, and apparently increasing.”); Samuel L. Bray, The Parable of the Forms, 93 ST.
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wonder why administrative adjudication should abandon its 
exceptionalism norm just as other fields are seeing the benefits of a 
more specialized approach. The answer comes back to the earlier point 
that uniformity and specialization are values that must be properly 
balanced. Civil procedure is a field that has historically been dominated 
by uniformity. That civil procedure scholars are currently more open 
to shifting the balance a bit further in the direction of specialization 
says nothing of what the balance is—or should be—in administrative 
adjudication. 
CONCLUSION
Over the decades since the APA was enacted, adjudication has 
followed its own course of development, straying far afield from the 
unwritten constitutional order that has evolved in the realms of 
rulemaking and judicial review. It has come to be ruled by an inverse 
and paradoxical norm of exceptionalism. This norm maximizes 
specialization and rejects uniformity, converting what should be a 
balance of core values into a zero-sum game. This has defeated the 
APA’s quest to ensure adequate minimum procedures in evidentiary 
hearings before administrative agencies. But the problem is both 
deeper and broader than the APA’s failure. Adjudication’s 
exceptionalism norm imperils individual rights, undermines 
transparency, stunts procedural evolution, interferes with both 
democratic and legal accountability, and corrodes legitimacy in a realm 
that is both vast and immensely important to the administrative 
enterprise. The norm should be abandoned in favor of a new regime 
designed to properly balance uniformity and specialization. This will 
require an interbranch effort to deliver on the fierce compromise 
worked out in the APA that agency adjudications should be subject to 
minimum procedural requirements. This may be a daunting task, but it 
will be well worth the undertaking.  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3178122 [https://perma.cc/BRU2-P5GD] 
(“[T]here is an increasing push for specialization in procedure.”).
